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-   -   Another brand new 737 Max crashes (http://forums.pelicanparts.com/off-topic-discussions/1023264-another-brand-new-737-max-crashes.html)

Jeff Higgins 03-18-2019 07:39 PM
Quote:
Originally Posted by madcorgi (Post 10395744)
Grand jury has started looking at the certification process. I recall (un)fondly what it was like to receive a grand jury subpoena at Boeing. Sends everyone into ass-covering mode.
Yikes. I never had the pleasure. FAA, JTSB, and other regulatory agency audits were enough for me.

Boy, you know, it's getting harder and harder to defend these guys. There were a few pretty big scandals while I was there, and a few folks went to prison over them, but none involved loss of life and airplanes auguring in. I really hope they get to the bottom of this and, if there were any behind the scenes shenanigans regarding quality, suppliers, training requirements, certification requirements, etc., heads really need to roll.

I feel for the engineering, technical, and mechanical folks at the company. In the past (and I bet once again) these kinds of colossal FUBARs consistently emanated from the "business" end of the business - the money men. The ones trying to cut corners and "maximize shareholder (or is that "stakeholder"?) value". The guys constantly telling the guys who design and build the damn airplane to find a cheaper way. Such were the bane of my existence. If this proves to be another one of their cost cutting mandates, I hope everyone involved gets their just deserts. :(

Fly Mach .86 03-18-2019 09:03 PM
It's always a lot cheaper to modify an existing design than come up with and get a new design through the certification process. When you start modifying an original design it can and does profoundly change the flying characteristics of the airplane. The original 727-100 was a good handling airplane. The -200 was stretched and many say didn't handle quite as well as the -100. Not terribly bad but just different. I flew the original 747-100 design and it flew much better (like flying a huge Beechcraft) than the -200 imho. The -200 was a better airplane but didn't handle as nice as the original design. The worst example of this was the DC-8. The original design flew quite nice. They even flew one supersonic ON PURPOSE!! I flew the stretched -71 and -73 models and it was the most difficult airplane I have ever flown. It had been stretched more than once, re-designed wings and re-engine a few times. I don't think the original 737 design needed MCAS. If this was an MCAS software problem I surely hope it can be fixed properly. Soon.

kach22i 03-19-2019 08:24 AM
Quote:
Originally Posted by Fly Mach .86 (Post 10395984)
It's always a lot cheaper to modify an existing design than come up with and get a new design through the certification process. When you start modifying an original design it can and does profoundly change the flying characteristics of the airplane.
Reminds me of this fiasco below.

2013
Coast Guard to decommission troubled 123s
https://www.militarytimes.com/2013/03/20/coast-guard-to-decommission-troubled-123s/
Quote:
The eight vessels were the produced under a contract to convert the Coast Guard's 49 110-foot patrol boats into 123-foot vessels.
I don't know who else caught the pilot union representative on NPR yesterday afternoon/last night, but the Boeing self-certification process didn't serve the public or the pilots very well this time. :eek:

widebody911 03-19-2019 08:26 AM
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/failed-certification-faa-missed-safety-issues-in-the-737-max-system-implicated-in-the-lion-air-crash/

kach22i 03-19-2019 08:32 AM
Quote:
Originally Posted by javadog (Post 10395811)
Actually, I think it is described in the manual. There are not very many simulators for the Max 8 yet, but...

I’m fairly certain that a competent pilot would recognize the fact that the stabilizer trim is being manipulated without pilot input. That is something that they do train for, it really doesn’t matter why the stabilizer is moving uncommanded. The fix is the same and it’s been that way for 50 years.

I don’t mean any disrespect to the pilots that crashed these two jets but I truly believe that that would not of happened with the frontline pilots we have here in this country.
From news reports, and I'm sure this will get clarified later, the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) pre-Lion Air crash was not in the manual. Pilots did not know of it's existence (allegedly).

After the Lion Air crash it became a supplemental addendum, and some are arguing that was not sufficient, that additional simulator time and training should be required as the 737 Max is certainly different than the 737 that came before it, something Boeing downplayed in order to sell aircraft and obtain certifications - or so current theories hypothesize.

kach22i 03-19-2019 08:38 AM
Quote:
Both Boeing and the FAA were informed of the specifics of this story and were asked for responses 11 days ago, before the second crash of a 737 MAX last Sunday.
Oh boy.

Quote:
Since MCAS was supposed to activate only in extreme circumstances far outside the normal flight envelope, Boeing decided that 737 pilots needed no extra training on the system — and indeed that they didn’t even need to know about it. It was not mentioned in their flight manuals.

That stance allowed the new jet to earn a common “type rating” with existing 737 models, allowing airlines to minimize training of pilots moving to the MAX.
Understatement of 2019........................

Quote:
Boeing’s safety analysis of the system assumed that “the pilots would recognize what was happening as a runaway and cut off the switches,” said the engineer. “The assumptions in here are incorrect. The human factors were not properly evaluated.”

flipper35 03-19-2019 08:38 AM
The trouble i have with that article is they state the MCAS only "activates" in extreme flight conditions. The anti-stall portion of MCAS activates then, but the system is always active to make the MAX feel the same in terms of flight characteristics of the earlier models like the NG. Otherwise it is a good article.

The MCAS was designed to allow pilots to fly the MAX without additional training by making the plane appear to behave like the older ones even though there were significant changes. The system was in the manual but I doubt many felt the need to mention the system since it was supposed to be unnoticed in the background as far as the pilots were concerned. After Lion air, there should not have been a pilot on the planet that was unaware of it, the characteristics of it and how to disable it.

The AoA issue as stated by an engineer on another forum after the Lion Air says that the system takes an out of proper parameters of one sensor and ignores the other, regardless of which sensor show the high AoA. It does not compare the two or vote or compare the readings to corroborate the possibly erroneous reading. Like having one kid tell you the house is on fire and the other kid says not. It automatically believes the kid that says the house is on fire, even if there is no other evidence. I am not sure this is exactly how it works, but i have seen it from a couple different ones.

beepbeep 03-19-2019 08:50 AM
Quote:
Originally Posted by flipper35 (Post 10396364)

The AoA issue as stated by an engineer on another forum after the Lion Air says that the system takes an out of proper parameters of one sensor and ignores the other, regardless of which sensor show the high AoA. It does not compare the two or vote or compare the readings to corroborate the possibly erroneous reading. Like having one kid tell you the house is on fire and the other kid says not. It automatically believes the kid that says the house is on fire, even if there is no other evidence. I am not sure this is exactly how it works, but i have seen it from a couple different ones.

From my reading on PPrune, it seems that MCAS basically alternates between single AoA sensors for each flight. No vote, no comparison...just picks 1,0,1,0,1,0 etc.

This is very puzzling decision, considering the harm that non-working MCAS can cause. How on earth did FAA really certified this as safe?? A bird hits wrong AoA sensor and weeee....10 seconds of pitch down you must fight with...repeatedly...

A350 where multiple sensors are sampled and voted by FBW logic for confidence looks like hedgehog:
http://forums.pelicanparts.com/uploa...1553010466.jpg

Cited from news article above:
"The original Boeing document provided to the FAA included a description specifying a limit to how much the system could move the horizontal tail — a limit of 0.6 degrees, out of a physical maximum of just less than 5 degrees of nose-down movement."

"After the Lion Air Flight 610 crash, Boeing for the first time provided to airlines details about MCAS. Boeing’s bulletin to the airlines stated that the limit of MCAS’s command was 2.5 degrees."

Oh boy...

kach22i 03-19-2019 08:53 AM
Quote:
Originally Posted by flipper35 (Post 10396364)
The trouble i have with that article is they state the MCAS only "activates" in extreme flight conditions. The anti-stall portion of MCAS activates then, but the system is always active to make the MAX feel the same in terms of flight characteristics of the earlier models like the NG. Otherwise it is a good article.
Thank you for the clarification, and it's an important one.

widebody911 03-19-2019 08:54 AM
How on earth did FAA really certified this as safe??

Apparently they didn't - Boeing did and the FAA rubberstamped it

flipper35 03-19-2019 08:59 AM
Also, the MCAS is only in effect when the aircraft is hand flown. Its sole purpose is for the pilot to think it flies the same as the older birds. As in so they don't have to be type rated in a different block aircraft.

Beepbeep, that could be, he may have no been clear in that it takes the high aoa warning from either sensor.

sammyg2 03-19-2019 09:05 AM
More info on the A330 control malfunction i mentioned earlier where the 'puter decided that the altitude was actually an AOA reading and dropped rapidly (10 degrees, almost 700 feet instantly).
Happened to three A330s, they never figured out why.
I'm sure it'll never happen again. I can't wait until computers are driving all the cars on the freeway

<iframe width="964" height="542" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/8AwPg6jbYMg" frameborder="0" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture" allowfullscreen></iframe>

<iframe width="964" height="542" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/MfIwh6LTQdg" frameborder="0" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture" allowfullscreen></iframe>

PetrolBlueSC 03-19-2019 09:27 AM
I predict that Boeing and Airbus will never allow their planes to be flown without pilots. If there is no pilot, who would they blame for design and training failures?

beepbeep 03-19-2019 09:42 AM
Quote:
Originally Posted by widebody911 (Post 10396394)
How on earth did FAA really certified this as safe??

Apparently they didn't - Boeing did and the FAA rubberstamped it
This is fcuked up on so many levels. Boeing gives FAA wrong info ("it's only 0.5 degrees, I swear"), on which FAA says "oh, go ahead and certify it yourself". So they do...except they tweaked it to 2.5 degrees as 0.5 didn't work...

javadog 03-19-2019 10:35 AM
From the article linked above:

"On the Lion Air flight, when the MCAS pushed the jet’s nose down, the captain pulled it back up, using thumb switches on the control column. Still operating under the false angle-of-attack reading, MCAS kicked in each time to swivel the horizontal tail and push the nose down again.

The black box data released in the preliminary investigation report shows that after this cycle repeated 21 times, the plane’s captain ceded control to the first officer. As MCAS pushed the nose down two or three times more, the first officer responded with only two short flicks of the thumb switches.

At a limit of 2.5 degrees, two cycles of MCAS without correction would have been enough to reach the maximum nose-down effect.

In the final seconds, the black box data shows the captain resumed control and pulled back up with high force. But it was too late. The plane dived into the sea at more than 500 miles per hour."

After correcting the problem 21 times, why did it not occur to the captain to turn off the damn stabilizer trim switches? I'd wager that he should have realized he had a problem with the stabilizer trimming itself without being commanded.

billybek 03-19-2019 11:02 AM
https://www.msn.com/en-ca/money/topstories/air-canada-grounds-boeing-max-8s-until-at-least-july-1/ar-BBUXV5k?ocid=spartandhp

Eric Coffey 03-19-2019 12:33 PM
Quote:
Originally Posted by javadog (Post 10395811)
I’m fairly certain that a competent pilot would recognize the fact that the stabilizer trim is being manipulated without pilot input. That is something that they do train for, it really doesn’t matter why the stabilizer is moving uncommanded. The fix is the same and it’s been that way for 50 years.
Yep, it's essentially a runaway trim issue. The procedure for dealing with such is in the manual, QRH, and is also a primary memory-item. The only real issue is that the initial action/ability to halt the auto-trim by manually pulling back on the yoke/column no longer works on an A/C with an MCAS fault. However, the follow-on procedure if the problem persists remains the same (stab. trim cut-out switches). So, any competent 737 driver should be able to deal with the problem effectively, even if they had no idea what MCAS was.
Quote:
Originally Posted by javadog (Post 10395811)
I don’t mean any disrespect to the pilots that crashed these two jets but I truly believe that that would not of happened with the frontline pilots we have here in this country.
With only 200 hours total, the FO of the last one wouldn't even be allowed in the right seat if it was a US flight.

Eric Coffey 03-19-2019 12:45 PM
Quote:
Originally Posted by javadog (Post 10396549)
After correcting the problem 21 times, why did it not occur to the captain to turn off the damn stabilizer trim switches? I'd wager that he should have realized he had a problem with the stabilizer trimming itself without being commanded.
+1

From post #82:
Quote:
Originally Posted by Eric Coffey (Post 10388175)
Not only that, but I believe it's only "active" when flying manually, and/or with flaps up, and/or with extreme pitch/bank angles. It can also be temporarily overridden via elec. trim switches on the yoke, or manual trim wheels.
Further, it would seem that the standard procedure for runaway trim is applicable to faulty MCAS, albeit a bit updated now.

I can't imagine how/why a pilot would attempt to "fight" a problem like that for any lengthy period of time before initiating runaway trim procedures, all the way to stab. trim cut-out. However, that appears to be a possibility with the Lion Air crew, and maybe even the Ethiopian flight (alt. oscillations noted). As mentioned, the previous crew on the Lion Air A/C had essentially the exact same problem. They dealt with it appropriately and continued their flight without issue.

That said, I still think the big problem is the lack of training/awareness of the new system, and the differences in the initial runaway trim procedure.
As I mentioned previously, one could halt runaway trim on the "old" 737 by simply pulling back on the column (break-away). That won't work on an MCAS equipped A/C. You have to disable the trim altogether (cut-out).
While that was always the final step in the "old" 737 runaway trim procedure, the initial step of pulling back on the yoke no longer works with a faulty MCAS system. Sort of counter-intuitive, IMO.
I think the system/procedures/manuals need a minor update to address the fact that trim break-away via control column is no longer effective.
Although, again, I can't imagine any competent 737 driver would just keep pulling back on the yoke, with no results, all the way to the ground.

daepp 03-19-2019 02:29 PM
Quote:
Originally Posted by Seahawk (Post 10392249)
The start of a flight and the terminal phase of a flight are when the aircrew is most diligent...that is when the majority of aircraft accidents happen.
http://forums.pelicanparts.com/uploa...1552673141.gif
I have no training in this area whatsoever, but I would think those stats gain even greater weight when you consider the takeoff and terminal phases are measured in minute, whereas the cruise phase is typically measured in hours.

Neilk 03-19-2019 07:48 PM
Well looks like the penultimate Lion Air flight had a savior in the form of a deadheading jumpseat pilot per Bloomberg

Quote:
That extra pilot, who was seated in the cockpit jumpseat, correctly diagnosed the problem and told the crew how to disable a malfunctioning flight-control system and save the plane, according to two people familiar with Indonesia’s investigation.
Points to bad training but also poor communication of new features by Boeing.

onewhippedpuppy 03-19-2019 08:05 PM
Quote:
Originally Posted by widebody911 (Post 10396394)
How on earth did FAA really certified this as safe??

Apparently they didn't - Boeing did and the FAA rubberstamped it
This isn’t as ominous as it sounds. The FAA appoints designees (DERs) in a very diverse and wide variety of discriplines, who have the ability to sign off on aircraft certification aspects on behalf of the FAA. This is in addition to the OEM maintaining a ODA which is essentially a certification organization per FAA regulations, which the designees are a part of. Because the FAA does not practically have the ability to review and approve every aircraft certification project, these people practically speaking are the FAA for these projects. The designees are subject matter experts and it’s very difficult to obtain and hold a DER, and the ODA is subject to a lot of regulation and frequent FAA audits. There are a lot of rules and protections in place to keep the DERs from being subjected to undue pressure by company leadership including revocation of ODA authority which I have seen happen. So it’s not necessarily a “Boeing employee rubber stamp” as some are saying.

madcorgi 03-19-2019 08:53 PM
Quote:
Originally Posted by onewhippedpuppy (Post 10397313)
This isn’t as ominous as it sounds. The FAA appoints designees (DERs) in a very diverse and wide variety of discriplines, who have the ability to sign off on aircraft certification aspects on behalf of the FAA. This is in addition to the OEM maintaining a ODA which is essentially a certification organization per FAA regulations, which the designees are a part of. Because the FAA does not practically have the ability to review and approve every aircraft certification project, these people practically speaking are the FAA for these projects. The designees are subject matter experts and it’s very difficult to obtain and hold a DER, and the ODA is subject to a lot of regulation and frequent FAA audits. There are a lot of rules and protections in place to keep the DERs from being subjected to undue pressure by company leadership including revocation of ODA authority which I have seen happen. So it’s not necessarily a “Boeing employee rubber stamp” as some are saying.
I agree it's not a rubber stamp, but you can bet those people are subject to implicit yet intense pressure to pass things along. Their compensation and career progression is in the hands of Boeing. Yes, this process is a force multiplier, and those folks are highly trained, serious people, but the system has an irreconcilable conflict of interest.

The DOJ has convened a grand jury to look at it, and if I were still there, I'd be on the team responding.

jyl 03-19-2019 10:38 PM
I have no qualifications to comment on 737s or airplanes, but do have a general thought about technology. With systems this complex, there is a judgment call on how much of the complexity do you ask the human to deal with vs how much do you have the system to handle. You can put it all on the human and risk causing an accident that way. You can hide it all from the human and risk causing an accident that way. After each accident, it is easy to say of course that particular aspect should have been manually controlled because of course the perfectly skilled and highly experienced pilot would have done exactly the right thing based on his perfect training and everything would have been fine. Designing systems by lawsuit and hindsight isn't the ideal way to do it. Maybe Boeing got this particular decision wrong but I wouldn't jump to the conclusion that the way it builds, tests and certifies airplanes is wrong. The right process can still lead to wrong decisions.

Sooner or later 03-20-2019 08:36 AM
I don't know if this has been brought up


https://www-bloomberg-com.cdn.ampproject.org/v/s/www.bloomberg.com/amp/news/articles/2019-03-19/how-an-extra-man-in-cockpit-saved-a-737-max-that-later-crashed?amp_js_v=a2&amp_gsa=1#amp_tf=From%20%251%2 4s&ampshare=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.bloomberg.com%2Fnews %2Farticles%2F2019-03-19%2Fhow-an-extra-man-in-cockpit-saved-a-737-max-that-later-crashed

Jumpseat rider played critical role in Indonesian cockpit

An off-duty pilot saved the 737 Max from a crash. The next day, the same plane on flight JT610 crashed into the sea.
As the Lion Air crew fought to control their diving Boeing Co. 737 Max 8, they got help from an unexpected source: an off-duty pilot who happened to be riding in the cockpit.

That extra pilot, who was seated in the cockpit jumpseat, correctly diagnosed the problem and told the crew how to disable a malfunctioning flight-control system and save the plane, according to two people familiar with Indonesia’s investigation.

The next day, under command of a different crew facing what investigators said was an identical malfunction, the jetliner crashed into the Java Sea killing all 189 aboard.

javadog 03-20-2019 09:02 AM
I've seen that. One more suggestion that the pilots were not up to snuff. Reports are that their was a great deal of panic expressed in the voices heard in the cockpit voice recorder.

When a pilot (the captain) adjusts the trim 21 times and fails to figure out he has an uncommanded trim problem, or recognizes it and doesn't know how to stop it, I'm going to say he shouldn't have been a captain. I understand that there was a lot going on but he had the presence of mind and time to keep adjusting the trim.

stomachmonkey 03-20-2019 09:55 AM
Quote:
Originally Posted by Sooner or later (Post 10397751)
I don't know if this has been brought up


https://www-bloomberg-com.cdn.ampproject.org/v/s/www.bloomberg.com/amp/news/articles/2019-03-19/how-an-extra-man-in-cockpit-saved-a-737-max-that-later-crashed?amp_js_v=a2&amp_gsa=1#amp_tf=From%20%251%2 4s&ampshare=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.bloomberg.com%2Fnews %2Farticles%2F2019-03-19%2Fhow-an-extra-man-in-cockpit-saved-a-737-max-that-later-crashed

Jumpseat rider played critical role in Indonesian cockpit

An off-duty pilot saved the 737 Max from a crash. The next day, the same plane on flight JT610 crashed into the sea.
As the Lion Air crew fought to control their diving Boeing Co. 737 Max 8, they got help from an unexpected source: an off-duty pilot who happened to be riding in the cockpit.

That extra pilot, who was seated in the cockpit jumpseat, correctly diagnosed the problem and told the crew how to disable a malfunctioning flight-control system and save the plane, according to two people familiar with Indonesia’s investigation.

The next day, under command of a different crew facing what investigators said was an identical malfunction, the jetliner crashed into the Java Sea killing all 189 aboard.
What I can't wrap my head around with this is if the same ****ing plane had a problem the day before it crashed why was it in service?

Did no one file a report that the thing was ****ed up?

Did maintenance not check it?

Did the airline not think to issue a bulletin to its pilots as a "heads up dudes, if this happens here's how to not die"?

flipper35 03-20-2019 09:56 AM
Many have stated the aircraft was not airworthy for that flight. Improper maintenance being the largest issue.

GH85Carrera 03-20-2019 10:46 AM
Quote:
Originally Posted by javadog (Post 10397798)
I've seen that. One more suggestion that the pilots were not up to snuff. Reports are that their was a great deal of panic expressed in the voices heard in the cockpit voice recorder.

When a pilot (the captain) adjusts the trim 21 times and fails to figure out he has an uncommanded trim problem, or recognizes it and doesn't know how to stop it, I'm going to say he shouldn't have been a captain. I understand that there was a lot going on but he had the presence of mind and time to keep adjusting the trim.
Every single passenger really hopes to have another Chesley Sullenberger or a pilot just like him as the pilot in command. He lost both engines and had zero panic, just 100% business, clear communications and make the right choices NOW.

Unfortunately we often get the folks that cheated on tests, did not read the manual, and should not be flying a ultralight much less a airliner.

It looks like Boeing has shot themselves right in the middle of their foot. With a large caliber gun. With 20/20 hindsight it is virtually incomprehensible they would design a system that wants to take control with just one sensor thinking there is a problem, and not make it perfectly clear to every pilot how to disable it quickly.

madcorgi 03-20-2019 11:39 AM
Quote:
Originally Posted by Sooner or later (Post 10397751)
I don't know if this has been brought up


https://www-bloomberg-com.cdn.ampproject.org/v/s/www.bloomberg.com/amp/news/articles/2019-03-19/how-an-extra-man-in-cockpit-saved-a-737-max-that-later-crashed?amp_js_v=a2&amp_gsa=1#amp_tf=From%20%251%2 4s&ampshare=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.bloomberg.com%2Fnews %2Farticles%2F2019-03-19%2Fhow-an-extra-man-in-cockpit-saved-a-737-max-that-later-crashed

Jumpseat rider played critical role in Indonesian cockpit

An off-duty pilot saved the 737 Max from a crash. The next day, the same plane on flight JT610 crashed into the sea.
As the Lion Air crew fought to control their diving Boeing Co. 737 Max 8, they got help from an unexpected source: an off-duty pilot who happened to be riding in the cockpit.

That extra pilot, who was seated in the cockpit jumpseat, correctly diagnosed the problem and told the crew how to disable a malfunctioning flight-control system and save the plane, according to two people familiar with Indonesia’s investigation.

The next day, under command of a different crew facing what investigators said was an identical malfunction, the jetliner crashed into the Java Sea killing all 189 aboard.
I saw that. Really remarkable, lucky that pilot was there, or we'd have had a disaster the day before. Incredible that that incident was not shared.

The PIC was an experienced, high-hour guy. I find it hard to believe that he would not understand an uncontrolled trim problem.

I haven't heard much about what the FDRs have revealed.

madcorgi 03-20-2019 11:46 AM
This came in today on the Lion Air crash. It seems that those pilots did not realize it was a trim issue and just wrestled the thing all the way down. Eerie and sad.

https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/cockpit-voice-recorder-reveals-moments-leading-lion-air-boeing-737-n985296

Reminds me of a case a friend of mine had where a throttle stuck open on a young lady's car on I-90 near Snoqualmie. She hammered the brakes for 60 miles til she got to 405, then crashed. It didn't occur to her to put the car into neutral or to switch off the key. People behave really oddly under stress.

gordner 03-20-2019 12:06 PM
I had a similar experience in a brand new cube van, driven by a person I would say is a car guy and mechanically apt. The throttle jammed wide open and, brakes were inadequate to stop it, and to this day I am sure it would have been an accident if I had not knocked it into neutral for him. He was so consumed with steering and holding the brake down, he forgot he had other means of engine control at hand.
Panic does weird things to your thinking for sure. Which is why training is supposed to make your required reactions second nature.

legion 03-20-2019 01:12 PM
I did a minor repair on my old 951 and took it for a test drive. After a few miles of successful testing, I decided to open it up. When I went to shift from 1st to 2nd the revs did not drop and instead pegged the red line and bounced off the rev limiter. First thing I did was to not release the clutch. Second thing I did was to put it in neutral. Third thing I did was to turn off the engine. Then I just coasted into a nearby parking lot and popped the hood.

The problem was immediately obvious: the throttle cam was stuck open on a hose clamp. 30 seconds later I had the hose clamp rotated out of interference with the throttle cam and the problem was fixed.

madcorgi 03-20-2019 04:23 PM
Quote:
Originally Posted by gordner (Post 10398097)
I had a similar experience in a brand new cube van, driven by a person I would say is a car guy and mechanically apt. The throttle jammed wide open and, brakes were inadequate to stop it, and to this day I am sure it would have been an accident if I had not knocked it into neutral for him. He was so consumed with steering and holding the brake down, he forgot he had other means of engine control at hand.
Panic does weird things to your thinking for sure. Which is why training is supposed to make your required reactions second nature.
I agree completely. Between racing, autocrossing, and track driving, I've spun a whole bunch of cars over the years. It took about five or six spins to successfully execute the "both feet in" rule, and several more to learn that that rule is not necessarily the best plan of action. That's a whole lot of spins required to unlearn things under natural stress reactions.

I don't know the extent to which modern airplanes allow "close to edge" events (do they spin airplanes in flight training?), or if they even have much "feel" left to them. I read up on today's "last seconds" stories on each crash, and it sounds like the captain was trying to find the answer in the manuals.

This is starting to feel like the usual confluence of machine/software/training/maintenance issues that crashes usually are.

p911dad 03-20-2019 05:42 PM
One I will never forget: I was checking out a guy I didn't know on a Piper Arrow many years ago, he claimed he had a license, hours, etc. He wanted to rent the plane for a few hours. I had him do a few maneuvers, and had him do a power-on stall. He froze with the yoke pulled fully back and wouldn't let go. I had to whack him after he didn't respond to my instruction (increasingly loud instruction!). I took control of the plane and we had a quiet ride back to the airport. In a stressful situation bad things can happn.

93nav 03-20-2019 06:45 PM
I have no personal experience, but I believe that pilots spend a lot of time in simulators going over emergency procedures. And the simulators will make you sweat.

Quote:
Originally Posted by madcorgi (Post 10398433)
I agree completely. Between racing, autocrossing, and track driving, I've spun a whole bunch of cars over the years. It took about five or six spins to successfully execute the "both feet in" rule, and several more to learn that that rule is not necessarily the best plan of action. That's a whole lot of spins required to unlearn things under natural stress reactions.

I don't know the extent to which modern airplanes allow "close to edge" events (do they spin airplanes in flight training?), or if they even have much "feel" left to them. I read up on today's "last seconds" stories on each crash, and it sounds like the captain was trying to find the answer in the manuals.

This is starting to feel like the usual confluence of machine/software/training/maintenance issues that crashes usually are.

Noah930 03-20-2019 07:49 PM
Quote:
Originally Posted by 93nav (Post 10398620)
I have no personal experience, but I believe that pilots spend a lot of time in simulators going over emergency procedures. And the simulators will make you sweat.
Yeah, but does the simulator simulate what happened on these two doomed flights?

kach22i 03-20-2019 08:17 PM
05/22/18
737 MAX: A YEAR OF SERVING THE GLOBE
https://randy.newairplane.com/2018/05/22/737-max-a-year-of-serving-the-globe/
http://forums.pelicanparts.com/uploa...1553138133.jpg
Quote:
RELIABILITY

With the 737 MAX, we added new functions and capabilities to make it the best single-aisle airplane in the market. When you put in all that new technology, you’re bound to have some teething in the beginning. But after working those out, the MAX is sitting at 99.4% schedule reliability. That’s the highest reliability of any new airplane entering service, and exactly where we expected to be 12 months into service.

Now, we’re driving toward even better numbers, targeting 99.7% reliability by the end of this year. All indicators show we’re right on track to get there as we work closely with our customers.

2016-02-12
Airbus A320 Neo vs Boeing 737 MAX
https://aviationvoice.com/airbus-a320-neo-vs-boeing-737-max-2-201602121522/
https://aviationvoice.com/wp-content...ng-737-max.jpg
Quote:
Since 2006, Boeing had been studying various replacement options for the 737 too. A decision on this replacement was postponed, and delayed until 2011. In November 2014, it was reported that Boeing intends to replace the 737 by 2030 with a new airplane. Debut and the record number of orders of Airbus A320neo forced Boeing to change their strategy. The pressure from airlines and aviation community for more fuel efficient aircraft forced Boeing to shelve their previous plans. On August 30, 2011, company‘s board of directors approved the 737 MAX project.

Today the 737 MAX is designed to be 14 percent more fuel-efficient than the current generation of 737s and has 3, 072 orders.

The MAX’s first flight came on 29th of January, 2016, nine days after the first delivery of the Airbus A320neo. Boeing is expected to deliver its first 737 MAX to customers in 2017. Southwest Airlines is scheduled to be the first airline to add the 737 MAX to its fleet.

javadog 03-21-2019 04:21 AM
“The captain of the doomed Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 never received updated training on a Boeing 737 Max 8 simulator, even though the airline had the technology available since January, according to a report.”

https://www.foxnews.com/travel/ethiopian-airlines-pilot-of-doomed-flight-didnt-receive-training-on-new-simulator-report

john70t 03-21-2019 05:55 AM
Quote:
Originally Posted by 93nav (Post 10398620)
I have no personal experience, but I believe that pilots spend a lot of time in simulators going over emergency procedures. And the simulators will make you sweat.
Just the other day I was flying in the FSX video game.
The twin DA-40 was trying to roll over hard and I was fighting controls while I was trying to figure out what was causing it. It was a low flight and there were some near misses with hills.

First I thought one engine was out but that would not cause that. Perhaps one flap had not retracted but I still hadn't put them down. Opposite rudder responded and elevators and ailerons all seemed to be affecting flight. Tried trim adjustment but no effect. I was panicked.

Then I realized autopilot was on. Pushed that and everything returned to normal.
That was minutes after the first signs of trouble. I failed that test as well.

kach22i 03-21-2019 09:17 AM
Quote:
Originally Posted by afterburn 549 (Post 10399166)
I would think REAL hard about ever buying an unproven platform again.
One of the oldest flying platforms out there.

Boeing 737
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_737
Quote:
The 737 was originally envisioned in 1964. The initial 737-100 made its first flight in April 1967, and entered airline service in February 1968 with Lufthansa.


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