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kach22i

03-15-2019 04:45 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by rfuerst911sc (Post 10391729)

I retired from a Lockheed facility that built C130's and F35 center wings . The push for speed and efficiency during the builds if not monitored can lead to things like FOD or sloppy work . Your internal processes have to be redundant to " catch " all mistakes . Sounds easy to the layman but look at the size of a C130 . How many mechanical fasteners in that bird ? How many miles of wires ? You get the idea . You have to have rock solid processes , great mechanics , great inspectors etc. and EVERYONE has to be on the same page to deliver a quality product to the customer . Just one breakdown in this chain can lead to serious consequences !

It will be interesting to see what the final results are from the investigations into these two crashes . What happens if both are determined to be pilot error ? Is it just simply more training ? How do you prove your training is " good enough " to release the fleet from being grounded ? I am not familiar with the training side of the aircraft industry so am curious how it works .

I think you have a solid outlook on this and as with the domestic automobile industry building quality products was not possible until management made it top priority.

One could blame the line workers all day long, but if management promoted speed/quantity over quality the end result was predictable.

Good Work Ainâ€™t Cheap... | RAW & UNFILTERED
https://66.media.tumblr.com/af024e1d...r6sx7k_500.jpg

kach22i

03-15-2019 04:51 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by DanielDudley (Post 10391203)

https://imgur.com/gallery/4llOkKn

Quote:

endlesstraveller 204 pts 15 hr

Amazing work with this post.

Not a single news outlet has explained things this clearly.

And this is coming from an aeronautical engineer

EDIT-1:

A link from Dan's link.

737 MAX - MCAS
http://www.b737.org.uk/mcas.htm

Quote:

MCAS was introduced to counteract the pitch up effect of the LEAP-1B engines at high AoA. The engines were both larger and relocated slightly up and forward from the previous NG CFM56-7 engines to accomodate their larger diameter. This new location and size of the nacelle causes it to produce lift at high AoA; as the nacelle is ahead of the CofG this causes a pitch-up effect which could in turn further increase the AoA and send the aircraft closer towards the stall. MCAS was therefore introduced to give an automatic nose down stabilizer input during steep turns with elevated load factors (high AoA) and during flaps up flight at airspeeds approaching stall.

Band-aids don't fix everything, I learned that as a kid.

EDIT-2:

Based on a reader's comment in Dan's link I looked up an earlier 737 problem.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_737_rudder_issues

Quote:

Boeing 737 rudder issues

During the 1990s, a series of rudder issues on Boeing 737 aircraft resulted in multiple incidents. In two separate accidents, pilots lost control of their Boeing 737 aircraft due to a sudden and unexpected movement of the rudder, and the resulting crashes killed everyone aboard. A total of 157 people aboard the two aircraft were killed.[1] Similar rudder issues led to a temporary loss of control on at least one other Boeing 737 flight before the problem was ultimately identified. The National Transportation Safety Board ultimately determined that the accidents and incidents were the result of a design flaw that could result in an uncommanded movement of the aircraft's rudder.[2]:13[3]:ix The issues were resolved after the NTSB identified the cause of the rudder malfunction and the Federal Aviation Administration ordered repairs for all Boeing 737 aircraft in service.

javadog

03-15-2019 04:55 AM

I have a feeling that inadequate training is going to be factor in this accident. It looks pretty certain that MCAS was involved and I’d wager that the pilots did not deal with it correctly. The root cause is still far from known but what has been published of the flight data so far shows some really odd values for the airspeed.

Seahawk

03-15-2019 05:00 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Jeff Higgins (Post 10391614)

IFor those of you unfamiliar with airline industry practices, "FOD" is a big, big deal. A really big deal. An enormously big deal.

Unfortunately, the CNN article is all too familiar to me. When SH-60B's were being refurbed at the Corpus Christi Army Depot, the acceptance test flight, which in a fleet squadron might take an hour, was an all day affair.

When I was the Chief Government Pilot at the Sikorsky factory the emphasis on FOD and other "clean" processes was unrelenting. The Air Force folks that accepted the tanker should be fired.

kach22i

03-15-2019 05:11 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by javadog (Post 10391800)

The extra training and MCAS would not be nessary if this plane didn't have a design flaw, or should I say shortcoming.

I know this sounds like blaming the design of the 911 and not the driver when in a turn the driver slams on the brakes or stomps on the gas and spins off the road tail first.

When you have a machine that is different the operator should be well aware of it's limitations.

Punch the gas too much on a 737 Max, nose goes up, MCAS puts you into a nose dive to avoid stall and the pilot is no longer in control of the aircraft - NOT GOOD.

Automation should be an aid to make the craft fly better and easier to control, and not a band-aid to fix a major design flaw - in my opinion.

Pilots complained about autopilot issues with Boeing jets involved in two deadly crashes
https://www.theverge.com/2019/3/13/18263751/boeing-737-max-8-pilot-complaint-autopilot-mcas

Quote:

The airplane’s nose can tilt down suddenly during takeoff, pilots aren’t being adequately trained on the autopilot system, and the operations manual is “criminally insufficient.” These are the complaints of US pilots in incident reports involving Boeing’s 737 Max 8 jetliner, the same model that was involved in two deadly crashes in recent months.

The reports, which were reported by multiple news outlets this week, cast a harsh light on the Max 8 jet that have been at the center of a global ban. More than 40 countries have grounded the airplane following two deadly crashes, one in Indonesia and the more recent one in Ethiopia. But the US Federal Aviation Administration continues to allow the plane to fly, and the Trump administration is being criticized for putting Boeing’s well-being over the safety of American passengers.

Quote:

Part of the planned update includes improving the Max 8’s “Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System,” Boeing said. According to The Air Current, the system was put in place to account for “some unique aircraft handling characteristics.”

.....................some unique aircraft handling characteristics................like flying into the ground on it's own?

javadog

03-15-2019 05:55 AM

I don't think you understand the MCAS system. There's a lot of info out there, some of it accurate, some of it not (like what you posted above.)

Jeff Higgins

03-15-2019 07:08 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by madcorgi (Post 10391667)

I have a gadget that looks like a push-broom with wheels that has a strong magnet in it. I use it frequently when I drop fasteners in my shop--picks up anything ferrous. Sounds like you guys could have used one. Unless the nut was titanium or something.

Spent a couple years prowling the factory floor during the 777 AP #1 era. Our factories were pretty damn clean, but the Heavies' even were cleaner. I visited them all as one of Mulally's entourage in 93 or 94.

The Dreamliner fiasco was a disaster that simply would not have happened under the "old guard" whose tender ministrations gently guided me for two years with exhortations of "I'm gonna put my foot up your ass sideways!" Missing an on-dock date by even a day was unimaginable, much less a couple of years!

It was the most inefficient, wasteful management system I ever saw, but we made our on-dock dates. Proving the time-honored rule that companies that can afford wasteful inefficiency tend to indulge in it. I had twice as many on my staff as I needed, all lifers way older than me, with too little meaningful work to keep them all busy, yet my bosses wanted to continue to grow their fiefdoms. I had two senior managers between me and my director.Morale was ****, and we lost every decent person we had. My Boeing on-site manager in Gifu was an idiot, went completely native, and could not get anything done. That guy could not have pulled a greasy string out of a sick cat's ass. He became an enemy, bombing us every night with faxes. After rollout, I got bored and left for my next Boeing gig before the layoffs and buyouts started. Everyone I knew either retired or bailed.

Gorgeous airplane, though. And all the parts made it on dock on schedule.

My experiences exactly. In the manufacturing side of the house, anyway. I'm afraid, or strongly suspect anyway, that every large manufacturer is like that, at least to a degree.

AOG was a haven from that. We had the luxury of the ability to quite thoroughly screen anyone and everyone who aspired to join our team. And yes, quite credible threats of "my foot up your ass" occurred on a daily basis. Failure, or even any measure of underperformance, was simply not an option.

Probably 3/4 of the guys who tried to get on the team washed out. We all had to travel on at least a couple, maybe three "tryout" trips, whereupon every member of the team on that trip got to vote on the new guy. Managers, engineers, QA personal - everyone voted. There was no hiding, no just "getting along" - you rocked your job or you went back to manufacturing.

Those of us who made the cut were in aerospace heaven - surrounded by the best of the best. Everyone worked their asses off. Everyone went that "extra mile" - or ten. We knew we could count on each other to do that. Everyone knew their stuff inside out, upside down, backwards and forwards. Fakes and morons were outed before their first trip was over. No "google educated experts" putting shopping cart wheels under their cars need apply.

kach22i

03-15-2019 07:11 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by javadog (Post 10391868)

I don't think you understand the MCAS system. There's a lot of info out there, some of it accurate, some of it not (like what you posted above.)

The last link wasn't exclusively about the Ethiopia incident, sorry about any confusion that may have caused you. :confused:

Ethiopian Airlines says analysis of flight recorders begins
https://www.apnews.com/e3feece30da04f8c801e63d45b9cdb87

Quote:

HEJERE, Ethiopia (AP) — Analysis of the flight recorders of the crashed Ethiopian Airlines plane has begun, the airline said Friday, and The New York Times reported that the pilot requested permission “in a panicky voice” to return to the airport shortly after takeoff as the plane dipped up and down sharply and appeared to gain startling speed.

The report cited “a person who reviewed air traffic communications” from Sunday’s flight saying controllers noticed the plane was moving up and down by hundreds of feet.

Doing a Google search with the terms "titan-server.arc.nasa.gov" I found this.

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19373707

Quote:

1. There have been 865 737 related ASRS reports since 1/1/2018

I never knew pilots had to write so many reports, some of these are almost novels based on detail and length.

Some scary stuff, like flight recorders not even installed.

David

03-15-2019 07:26 AM

A question to pilots: how many planes nose up when you throttle up?

Fly Mach .86

03-15-2019 08:03 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by David (Post 10392027)

A question to pilots: how many planes nose up when you throttle up?

They almost ALL nose up but it's a question of degree. Under wing mounted engines will nose up to some degree when power is increased. An increase in speed will also necessitate a down movement with the trim wheel because of a nose up tendency. This should be easily controlled and is not a violent change in pitch attitude. (At least it shouldn't be).

gordner

03-15-2019 09:55 AM

The 200 hour FO was most likely the pilot-not-flying, if the high time captain had been PNF the MCAS system would likely have been inhibited right away, turned off and breakers pulled.
Both PNF and PF have duties that can be critical depending on the flight phase. A 200 hour guy in the right seat is honestly absolutely a disaster waiting to happen.

flipper35

03-15-2019 10:05 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by kach22i (Post 10391796)

Wow, this is the most informative big picture presentation of the 737 Max system/situation I've seen to date.

Thank you for posting it.

It kind of smacks me in the head with a big "duh" moment.

A comment from the link above.

EDIT-1:

A link from Dan's link.

737 MAX - MCAS
737 MAX - MCAS

Band-aids don't fix everything, I learned that as a kid.

EDIT-2:

Based on a reader's comment in Dan's link I looked up an earlier 737 problem.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_737_rudder_issues

Mac McClellan has a good article on it. The one above isn't as concise as it should be and misses a couple points. One thing odd is the transponder on the Ethiopian flight cuts off while still at altitude which may corroborate some witnesses mentioning fire on board.

https://airfactsjournal.com/2019/03/can-boeing-trust-pilots/

"This concept of adding artificial feel using the pitch trim has been around for years. It has been used to add stick force at high speed cruise where Mach effects can alter stick force as well as at higher AOA where stall margins must be maintained.

What’s critical to the current, mostly uninformed discussion is that the 737 MAX system is not triply redundant. In other words, it can be expected to fail more frequently than one in a billion flights, which is the certification standard for flight critical systems and structures."

"Though the pitch system in the MAX is somewhat new, the pilot actions after a failure are exactly the same as would be for a runaway trim in any 737 built since the 1960s. As pilots we really don’t need to know why the trim is running away, but we must know, and practice, how to disable it."

Seahawk

03-15-2019 10:05 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by gordner (Post 10392239)

Not necessarily true...I have flown with some low time in model folks that had it wrapped.

The issue to me is needing to pull a circuit breaker...that is completely unsat...and would be the reason I would have grounded the aircraft.

A pilot needs an on/off switch, a method of overriding all "aids" to flight that is in scan and reach immediately; day and night, visual and instrument scan.

The start of a flight and the terminal phase of a flight are when the aircrew is most diligent...that is when the majority of aircraft accidents happen.

http://forums.pelicanparts.com/uploa...1552673141.gif

flipper35

03-15-2019 10:09 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Fly Mach .86 (Post 10392073)

In this case the engines are further forward, larger and more powerful moving the thrust line further from the center of gravity which exacerbates the issue. The MCAS was designed, in part, to make the MAX feel the same as an older airframe like the NG. Making it fly like the older airframe means there does not have to be significant training involved to fly the new airframe saving airlines money.

Neilk

03-15-2019 10:19 AM

So apparently Boeing is going to roll out a software fix in 10 days.

I am curious how are airplanes updated, I imagine it is more than a USB drive?

flipper35

03-15-2019 10:25 AM

Same way Tesla does it!

javadog

03-15-2019 10:27 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Seahawk (Post 10392249)

The MCAS system is disabled temporarily by a trim switch input by either pilot. That would buy enough time to flip the circuit breaker’s. I think the difficulty lies in the pilots recognizing what’s going on. There of been incidents in the US where the pilots had to intervene and they had no difficulty.

I think there is a difference in how the AOA information is fed into the computer, on the left and right sides of the cockpit. I don’t recall the details, but I think there was something different on the right side, which made me wonder at the time why they did it.

I really wonder how much of the problem lies with the complexity of the training and of the manuals and the fact that for many of these pilots English is not their first language.

Eric Coffey

03-15-2019 11:16 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by flipper35 (Post 10392248)

https://airfactsjournal.com/2019/03/can-boeing-trust-pilots/

"Though the pitch system in the MAX is somewhat new, the pilot actions after a failure are exactly the same as would be for a runaway trim in any 737 built since the 1960s."

That isn't entirely true.

From post #44:

Quote:

Originally Posted by Eric Coffey (Post 10386131)

...there is another aspect of the MCAS system that I can see compounding the problem, especially under stress. That is the yoke break-away. Typically, one could simply apply enough force on the yoke in the opposite direction to disengage the AP/electric trim commands. On the MCAS-equipped Max, pulling back on the control column will not disengage stab. trim if the problem was caused by faulty AOA sensor. Yikes...

From post #87:

Quote:

Originally Posted by Eric Coffey (Post 10388175)

That said, I still think the big problem is the lack of training/awareness of the new system, and the differences in the initial runaway trim procedure.
As I mentioned previously, one could halt runaway trim on the "old" 737 by simply pulling back on the column (break-away). That won't work on an MCAS equipped A/C. You have to disable the trim altogether (cut-out).
While that was always the final step in the "old" 737 runaway trim procedure, the initial step of pulling back on the yoke no longer works with a faulty MCAS system. Sort of counter-intuitive, IMO.

Eric Coffey

03-15-2019 11:19 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by gordner (Post 10392239)

A 200 hour guy in the right seat is honestly absolutely a disaster waiting to happen.

Agree.

From post #116:

Quote:

Originally Posted by Eric Coffey (Post 10389388)

The FO on that A/C is reported to have +/- 200 hours TOTAL. If that's true, it is rather scary.
You would not be allowed to fly right seat (SIC/FO) of any commercial airline in the US with only 200 hrs. That is WAY below even the lowest "restricted" ATP requirements.

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