| fastpat |
01-10-2007 12:42 PM |
Yes, as I've said, military hardware in neat fun; and largely a complete waste of money and ultimately, human beings.
Quote:
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Lightning II Program
F-35/JSF production totals are more likely to be in the 2,000-3,000 aircraft range than the 4,000-5,000 or 6,000 sometimes cited. Foreign partners have expressed intent to buy about 700 aircraft between 2012 and 2015, but no formal agreements have been signed as of early 2005.
In 1996 the program included 2,978 aircraft for the US: 2,036 for the Air Force, 642 for the Marines, 300 for the US Navy, as well as another 60 for the Royal Navy. The May 1997 QDR reduced procurement for the US to 2,852: 1,763 for the Air Force, 609 for the Marines, and up to 480 for the Navy. The 1997 QDR noted that up to 230 of the Navy's 480 JSFs could be replaced by F/A-18E/Fs, depending on the progress of the JSF program and the price of its Navy variant compared to the F/A-18E/F.
As of 2001 the first operational Joint Strike Fighter, re-designated as the F-35, was scheduled for delivery in fiscal 2008. A total of 2,852 planes were scheduled for delivery starting in 2008 for the US Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and a small number to the British Royal Navy. Other nations interested in participating in the program include the Netherlands, Belgium and Norway. The requirements of 1,763 strike fighters for the Air Force, 609 for the Marine Corps and 480 for the Navy had held steady since the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review.
As of 2001 program estimates peg the recurring JSF unit flyaway costs at $37 million for the Air Force conventional takeoff and landing variant, $46 million for the Marine Corps short takeoff vertical landing variant and $48 million for the Navy carrier version, in 2002 dollars.
As of late March 2002 the Pentagon was reviewing a proposal to cut JSF production by 400 aircraft and limit the Navy's F/A-18E/F acquisition to 460 aircraft versus 548. The JSF reductions, which could be split about equally between the Marine Corps STOVL and the Navy's carrier versions, would reduce the total buy to about 2,600.
In April 2002 the Navy - concerned that it could not afford the number of tactical aircraft it planned to purchase - reduced the number of JSF aircraft for joint Navy and Marine Corps operations from 1,089 to 680 by reducing the number of backup aircraft needed. News reports in 2002 indicated that the proposed reduction would cut 259 jets from the Marine Corps buy, and 50 from the Navy purchase, resulting in a total F-35B buy of 350.
JSF Program 2003 Developements
The Pentagon requested $3.4 billion for JSF development in fiscal year 2003, up from $1.5 billion in FY2002. At that time the planned budget was $3.8 billion in fiscal 2004, $5.7 billion in 2005 and $5.7 billion in 2006.
As of early 2003 the Air Force was tentatively scheduled to receive its first F-35 in 2008, but initial operational capability (IOC) for the service was set for 2011. The US Navy, along with the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force, was scheduled for a 2012 IOC. The Marine Corps, with an IOC planned for 2010, would be the first of the military services to operate a fleet of F-35s.
By the end of 2003 it appeared that the cost of developing the Joint Strike Fighte could increase by as much as $5 billion, to $38 billion, and the project could fall more than a year behind schedule. The increase would be mostly because of the higher-than-expected cost of developing parts of the technology and the addition of new capabilities for the fighter jet. Part of the additional cost would be to add anti-tampering technology to the plane, which would prevent foreign buyers from replicating sensitive systems. That could add $1 billion to $2 billion to the program's budget. The proposed increase would also put aside more money for unforeseen changes in design requested by the military or for development problems. The Joint Strike Fighter was expected to be the largest weapons program in Pentagon history, ultimately costing nearly $200 billion. The first fighter was expected to enter service in 2008.
JSF Program 2004 Developements
According to the DOT&E, weight growth was a significant risk for all three variants of the F-35 JSF. Aircraft weight is not a key performance parameter, but weight does impact the aircraft's ability to satisfy key performance requirements. No variant of the F- 35 JSF design exceeds the weight at which key performance parameters predictions are breached; however, the STOVL design remained consistently above target weight projections. The JPO was aggressively pursuing weight reduction initiatives. Additional aircraft weight reductions were required, particularly in the case of the STOVL variant, to satisfy all key performance parameters and preserve sufficient weight reserve for post SDD block upgrades.
Weight issues and signifi cant fundamental configuration changes forced the conclusion that the air vehicle design was insuffi ciently mature to satisfy all criteria for an upcoming Air System Critical Design Review. Thus, a new culture emerged that involved establishment of new indicators of progress, directed by clearly identified goals for the 2004-2005 time frame. Expect the Exceptional became much more than a Guiding Principle - it was a daily operating principle.
The F-35 JSF Program SDD schedule is aggressive and aircraft weight reduction efforts have eroded a significant portion of available development time. The first flight of the US Air Force conventional takeoff and landing variant was scheduled for 2005, followed by the STOVL variant. This schedule is very challenging. The F-35 JSF Program should remain event driven with continued weight reduction efforts and design optimization before producing SDD test aircraft. The decisions the JPO face at this point in the program are significant drivers to cost and performance limitations through the life cycle of an aircraft.
In 2004, DOD extended the JSF program schedule to address problems discovered during systems integration and the preliminary design review. Design efforts revealed significant airframe weight problems that affected the aircraft's ability to meet key performance requirements. Software development and integration also posed a significant development challenge. Program officials delayed the critical design reviews, first flights of development aircraft, and the low-rate initial production decision to allow more time to mitigate design risk and gather more knowledge before continuing to make major investments. As a result, the initial operational capability date was delayed.
As of late 2004 there was uncertainty about the number and mix of variants the services plan to purchase will also affect JSF's acquisition plans. While the Air Force had announced its intention to acquire the short takeoff and vertical landing variant, it had yet to announce when or how many it expects to buy or how this purchase will affect the quantity of the conventional takeoff and landing variant it plans to buy. In December 2004, Air Combat Command officials indicated that the Air Force was considering buying about 250 short takeoff and landing JSFs and about 1,300 conventional takeoff and landing JSFs. However, these numbers were not official.
The number and mix of JSF variants that the Navy and Marine Corps intend to purchase - and their related procurement costs - remain undetermined. However, as of late 2004 the Navy had not indicated to the developer the exact mix of the carrier and short takeoff and vertical landing variants it intended to purchase.
The cost estimate to fully develop the JSF had increased by over 80 percent from 1996 to 2004. DOD expected that by using a joint development program for the three variants instead of three separate programs, JSF development costs could be cut by about 40 percent. However, cost increases have nearly eroded all of the estimated savings. Development costs were originally estimated at $24.8 billion. By the 2001 system development decision, these costs had increased by $9.6 billion largely because of a 36-month schedule extension to allow more time to mature the mission systems and a more mature cost estimate.
The program successfully completed a DAB review on June 17, 2004. However, there continue to be some concerns with Congressional funding, as represented by the House Armed Services Committee decision to reduce funding to the program pending the IRT report and the JSF program office response.
In November 2004 Defense Department's Acting Undersecretary for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Michael Wynne approved program changes to fix a weight problem plaguing one version of the plane. He also authorized a transition production contract for the F136 engine, made by General Electric and Rolls-Royce Group. This review focused on the cost and schedule implications of the re-baseline effort, contractor performance to date on STOVL weight reduction, and the program's response to the IRT report on the program.
By 2004, costs increased an additional $10.4 billion to $44.8 billion. The program office cited several reasons, including efforts to achieve greater international commonality, optimize engine interchangeability, refine the estimating methodology, and extend the schedule for unexpected design work. Almost half of this increase, $4.9 billion, was a result of an approximately 18-month delay for unexpected design work caused by increased aircraft weight that degraded the aircraft's key performance capabilities.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military//systems/aircraft/f-35-program.htm
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