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"If it's Boeing, you ain't going"

Quote:

Originally Posted by Jeff Higgins (Post 7238946)

Yes, there is. The former Mickie-Dee's employees have a grossly overestimated view of themselves, particularly their "engineers" (who in reality were no more than "project managers") by then. Everyone else in the industry agrees - the problems at Boeing are a direct result of adopting MD management philosophies and managers, wherein engineers quit designing and picked up project managing instead. Google "adopting the practices of a failed aerospace company" (or something like that) for some enlightening reading.

A lack of cash flow and dwindling (actually non-existant by then) market share brought about by the extreme risk-adverse culture that Aboulafia mentions. No one's fault but MD's - their corporate culture led directly to that sad state of affairs. Every industry analyst that has ever bothered to comment on that situation is in agreement.

Hell, by that time, McDonnel had taken one previously proud, productive, civilian sector manufacturer - Douglas - and ruined it with his miserly, government contract dependent, penny pinching ways. He would never invest his own money - only taxpayers' money. That's what killed MD as a viable commercial airplane manufacurer. That, and trying to use its remaining "engineers" as project managers instead.

Actually, by then, there were no "equivalent MD guys" - whoever was left there as an "engineer" had been turned into a project manager. All the guys who really wanted to be (and had the werewithal to be) design engineers had already left.

So of course those who were left saw the Boeing engineers as "idiots" - they couldn't understand what they were doing, why it took so long, and why it costs so much. That's a very (all too) common view of engineering work from the outside looking in; and a view that got MD into the predicament it was in then, and subsequently allowed MD management to force Boeing into its current situation.

And that's where the failure began, as chronicled by many industry experts - when Mickie-Dee's management was given charge over Boeing engineers. The tail wagging the dog in the most engineering-intensive undertaking mankind has ever tackled. We all knew it was wrong, and where it would lead.

MD had a long, sordid history of undervaluing engineering. They saw it as just another commodity, that could be purchased off the shelves of a world market. Maybe the "talent" they had at the time led them to that conclusion, or maybe that attitude led to the "talent" they were left with - a real "chicken or the egg" question. But I digress...

They were the first to significantly outsource engineering. We simply never did that at Boeing, until MD bean counters came in. Prior to that, Boeing had always valued the engineering culture that was developed here, and understood that it could not be matched anywhere. That culture has always attracted the cream of the crop, because engineers knew they would be working not only with other engineers, but more importantly, for other engineers. The rest wound up at places like, well, MD - where they didn't "engineer" a damn thing, but turned into "project managers" riding herd over incompetent suppliers, wondering why engineers are such "idiots"...

+100.

33 years in the industry. 16 years Boeing Flight Test, left in 2001. CEO/supplier to Boeing (among several others). After the 777 introduction I would have bet hard cash that I wasn't to leave until retirement. After the merger, couldn't see staying. I have friends in flight test who are working hard to understand the current problem which no one wanted to see happen.

I don't have an engineering background, but being in construction/management, I know who/what/where should be happening and what should not. I've only been here a year, but every day I see a bloated workforce that's incompetent, from the mechanic to first/second management. Not everyone of course, but a signifigant portion. Granted, I'm in one cell that produces one "part", but I see and hear it's typical of whats going on. This really scares me and makes me wonder if it's company wide. I can only hope not.

In the case of the 787 batteries, I don't think it's a manpower issue, but something else. I just don't know enough.

Quote:

Originally Posted by Jeff Higgins (Post 7238946)

Actually, by then, there were no "equivalent MD guys" - whoever was left there as an "engineer" had been turned into a project manager. All the guys who really wanted to be (and had the werewithal to be) design engineers had already left.

Oh, whatever. You have your view of reality and I have mine. That scenario has played out in many threads, obviously. I worked side-by-side for years with Boeing engineers starting in 1998 (what is your experience with McDonnell Douglas?) and developed my viewpoints honestly. I'll let it go at that. No pissing contest is necessary.

As always, believe what you want to believe but to blame 787 issues on McDonnell Douglas is naive.

Quote:

Originally Posted by IROC (Post 7239460)

Mike, that was in no way meant to be personal. I'm sorry you took it that way.

I have 33 years in this business. I've worked off and on with MD engineers for years, beginning with the "717", just a reworked MD80, which was all MD's commercial end was capable of anymore by then. The lack of configuration control MD held over their own aircraft was astonishing; their suppliers had full configuration authority for their individual contributions. MD didn't even know what they were installing into their own airplane anymore. No one at MD - particularly their "engineers" working as project managers - had any clue on how to bring that one across the finish line. Their engineering expertise was long gone; left behind were "project managers" who were completely helpless. We abandoned that one just as soon as we were contractually able.

Then there was the C17; I helped with several projects on that one. In this I found a whole new level of astonishment - in the late 1990's and early 2000's, MD and some of their suppliers on this program were still releasing board drawings. Yup, hand drafted on vellum, totally old school. At that late date, when the entire rest of the aerospace industry had been on some form of CAD for at least decade (or more), MD was developing at least some of the C17 on the board. They were too damn cheap to buy the CAD equipment necessary to do the job, or to train their "engineers" to use it.

These were the two most incredibly wasteful, mismanaged, poorly engineered airplane programs I have ever seen. No wonder the C17 program initially tried to stiff the U.S. taxpayer for $700 million a pop, in 1990's dollars, no less. Even at that steep price tag, they were reportedly losing money on them.

Quote:

Originally Posted by IROC (Post 7239460)

As always, believe what you want to believe but to blame 787 issues on McDonnell Douglas is naive.

Well, as always, your simplistic understanding of what I believe is way off the mark. I was merely commenting on the state of affairs at MD when they collapsed. This is all very well documented history, Mike, not merely what I believe.

I was in no way assigning responsibility for our 787 problems to MD. I was drawing parallels between their failures and our failure. The same management philosophies were in play at both companies. Boeing learned those philosophies from MD. Or, more specifically, Harry Stonecipher. We did not have to go down that path. We had a very visible, very recent example to learn from - a once proud aerospace company that had chosen that path and had failed. We could have (should have) learned from that example. We chose not to. That choice was ours. The blame lies squarely with Boeing. This too is very well documented history - not merely what I believe.

It is funny, in the Solar business, many are considering Li-Ion. The charge controllers are not setup to properly charge Li-Ion. For Solar, since we're not moving (generally), Lead-Acid is still the norm. Although in my applications, my customer requires liquid Nickle-Cadmium batteries, because of life issues.

We are exploring Molten Salt as an alternative to Nickle-Cadmium. If the Sumitomo battery pans out, Li-Ion is done. Twice the power density at 10% of the cost. And with the very long life and high current capability, it might replace lead-acid in starting cars.

From a report I have seen here at Boeing St. Louis, the problem isn't the batteries. Testing on both the good and burnt batteries show no faults. Now they are looking into the system(s) that charge, cool and monitor the batteries. Engineering will find the problems and fix them. Then another round of flight test will be conducted to stress the system beyond 100% design and the FAA will again certify the aircraft good to go.

The 787 has already proven itself as lighter, stronger, quieter and can carry a heavier payload longer and faster than other aircraft of it's class. And just like other newly introduced aircraft no matter who built them, bugs will happen. After all, it is a man made product and nothing built by man is perfect.

So bottom line, the problems are being addressed and will be corrected.

The A380 had bigger problems, with its engines. This will be fixed.

[QUOTE=LakeCleElum;7237760] that builds up static electricity......Creates problems with excessive battery volatge?

2) Engineering has been out-sourced......Certain countries (Italy) have totally different standards and does not mesh well with the product the Boeing Engineers in the US have done.......

The voltages have been determined to be in metric.

[QUOTE=madmmac;7241116]

Quote:

Originally Posted by LakeCleElum (Post 7237760)

The voltages have been determined to be in metric.

watts wrong with that? :rolleyes:

Simulation does not equal testing.

CAD and FE models do not equal full-up hardware prototypes.

Too many MBA and finance types and too few engineers in upper management.

I read the 787 wing loading qualification test was not taken to failure; I find this peculiar.

"Neutron Jack's" legacy keeps on giving.

Wasn't outsourcing a big issue with AIRBUS? You would think that Boeing would think twice about doing it.

Some informative and interesting posts here. I don't have anything to add except to say that this seems to be yet another example of why large corporate mergers, particularly when there are quite divergent corporate cultures, rarely work out for the best.

Carefully read the text on the warning label attached to the battery:

http://forums.pelicanparts.com/uploa...1359629492.jpg

You could interpret those instructions (clearly written by a non-English speaker) to mean that you can use a Ni-cd charger, as long as you don't also use another charger at the same time. It also suggests that this battery uses the same connector type as Ni-cd batteries.

I'd be looking into user error.