Here's a european investigative report - their version of the NTSB, I guess about an Airbus A-320 which had several spoilers left in"maintenance"(hydraulic bypass) mode:
http://www.rvs.uni-bielefeld.de/publications/Incidents/DOCS/ComAndRep/Gatwick/pm-excalibur.html
After the replacement of the right-hand outer flap (following damage from an earlier bird strike) the aircraft was handed over to the flight crew at 1500 hours UTC on 26 August 1993. The pilots carried out the usual pre-flight checks, during which they observed nothing amiss, and began the take-off roll at 15.30.
At the take-off rotation at 153 kt., an uncommanded roll to the right occurred. The co-pilot, who was the Pilot Flying (PF), at first attributed this to cross-wind, and applied left stick. When full left stick did not contain the roll, he assumed his sidestick was faulty and handed control to the commander, who immediately found that he too needed full left stick to keep the wings level.
As the aircraft passed 1,700 feet the Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitoring (ECAM) system sounded a repetitive chime and displayed on its upper screen the messages F/CTL ALTN LAW and F/CTL SPLR FAULT, indicating a significant fault which had caused the Electrical Flight Control System (EFCS) to go into "alternate law" and that the fault involved the spoilers. Roll control improved slightly after flap retraction.
The co-pilot notified Gatwick Air Traffic Control (ATC) that they were returning, and was told to take up the holding pattern at Mayfield (10 nm SE of Gatwick) at 3,000 ft. This required several left turns. Unfortunately they could only turn right. ATC obliged with alternative directions.
The crew reviewed the warnings displayed on the ECAM screen and responded with the necessary actions. ECAM provides what is in effect a "help" facility to the pilots, and in this case instructed them to do a FLAPS 3 landing (22 degrees of slat and 20 degrees of flap) at 10 kt faster than normal reference air speed, and to allow for a 20% increase in landing distance. ATC guided them via right turns to intercept Runway 08 ILS centreline at about 8 nm.
They told the cabin crew to strap the passengers in and announced that they were returning to Gatwick as a result of a slight technical hitch.
As they prepared to land, they first selected FLAPS 1 (18 degrees of slat and 0 degrees of flap) and noticed no change in their (already poor) roll control. When they went to FLAPS 2 (slats 22 degrees, flaps 15 degrees) the commander found that once again he required full left stick to keep the wings level. Having judged landing to be unsafe in these conditions, they reverted to FLAPS 1 and went around.
The co-pilot looked at the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) and at the Flight Crew Operating Manual, Volume 3 (FCOM 3), Section 2 "Abnormal and Emergency Procedures", for advice on a FLAPS 1 landing, but could not find the pages he wanted (containing the corrections to be made to the normal approach speed and required landing distance in various flight surface failure conditions). The commander then pulled from his flight bag a photocopy of the relevant section from an earlier version of FCOM 3, on which he had renumbered the pages according to the latest release. With the help of this the co-pilot was able to locate the correct manual page, and obtain the correction data for a FLAPS 1 landing (25% increase in approach speed, 30% increase in required landing distance).
They landed in FLAPS 1 configuration at 168 kt in "direct law" and came to a stop without difficulty. (Runway 08 was easily long enough to accommodate the increased landing distance required, and they left the runway at an exit 370m from the end.) The aircraft was towed to the stand, where the passengers disembarked normally.
During taxiing, it was observed that several spoilers were up, and inspection revealed that right-hand spoilers 2, 3, 4 and 5 were in "maintenance mode". These were returned to "operation mode", a duplicate inspection of the spoiler function was carried out, and the aircraft was returned immediately to service.
Following take-off, the pilots noticed a problem with roll control. Spoilers 2 to 5 on the right wing were floating, and were lifted by the airflow.
However, only as they passed 1500 ft radio altitude did a warning sound. The Centralized Fault Display System (CFDS) detected the malfunction at 15.31, immediately after take-off (as shown by its automatic records, which were interrogated by the AAIB investigators).