[fintstone]

If you really want to support the troops; perhaps this article will help:

National Review
March 5, 2007
Pg. 30

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The crying need for a bigger U.S. military

By Jim Talent

In 1979, the captain of the USS Canisteo refused to certify his ship as seaworthy, because, in his opinion, his men had not been adequately trained. It was the first time in 15 years that a U.S. Navy captain had refused to take his ship to sea. His courage, coupled with a blistering report about lack of military readiness authored by former defense secretary Melvin Laird, and followed in 1980 by the Desert One fiasco in Iran, made graphically clear that years of underfunding had left America’s military “hollow.” Like a freshly painted house with no plumbing or wiring inside, the military looked functional; but in reality, it was too poorly trained and equipped to be reliable.

At the time, America’s resolution was already in question because of Vietnam and the weakness of foreign policy during the Carter years. It was no accident that by the end of President Carter’s term the Soviets had invaded Afghanistan and the new regime in Iran had seized the American embassy in Tehran. America’s enemies were reacting to her weakness like rats in a room where the lights had gone dim: They had come out of their holes and begun to probe, scouting for opportunities to advance their ambitions and threaten U.S. security.

President Reagan had no formal experience in foreign policy and no training in military affairs. But he understood the basic equation of world leadership: force plus resolve equals power. Despite the large budget deficits, President Reagan secured two immediate double-digit increases in the defense budget, followed by substantial increases for several years thereafter.

The effect was electric. Military morale skyrocketed. Training improved, and the Pentagon was able to recapitalize its “platforms” — the military term for ships, planes, and vehicles — with equipment that used the latest technology and was therefore less vulnerable and more lethal. The geriatric leaders of the USSR, who a few years before had dreamed of building a blue-water navy that could challenge the U.S., now realized that they were in a competition they could not possibly win: The “correlation of forces” was moving decisively in the direction of freedom. Throughout the rest of the 1980s, the reality of growing American power, coupled with Reagan’s eloquence and conviction, forced the Soviets increasingly into a corner. Finally they threw in the towel. Only a few years later, America’s newly empowered military paid another dividend: It provided the overwhelming force behind Operation Desert Storm. The strategic buildup Reagan initiated made possible the end of the Cold War, and the peace and prosperity that America enjoyed throughout the 1990s, and up until 9/11.

America is now reaching a decision point similar to the one Reagan faced in 1981, and it is important to understand clearly what is at stake. America is the defender of freedom in the world and therefore always a prime target for those who hate freedom. The progress of the international order toward peace and democracy depends on American power; and while the basket of Western foreign policy contains many tools, what underpins them all is a U.S. military that the world knows is capable of defeating threats swiftly and effectively.

Judged by this standard, the situation facing the U.S. military is grave. America’s armed forces are, in one respect, better off than in 1981. The volunteer force is a proven, mature, and successful model; America is protected by the finest servicemen and women in history. But because of decisions over the last 15 years — driven more by budgetary than by military considerations — the Army is too small, the Navy and Marine Corps may well be too small, and much of the equipment in all the services is too old and increasingly unreliable. Without a substantial increase in procurement spending, beginning now and sustained over the next five to ten years — an increase measured not in billions but in tens of billions of dollars per year above current estimates — the U.S. will be unable to modernize its forces to the degree necessary to preserve its security with the necessary margin of safety.

President Bush, to his credit, has submitted a budget for FY 2008 that begins to recognize the true requirements of American security. If the president has his way, defense spending will increase by more than 10 percent over last year. That is a hugely important first step, but it is not enough. Congress should give the president his request for defense this year — but both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue also need to adopt a rule that the core defense budget should never sink below 4 percent of the nation’s GDP. The War on Terror will eventually end, but the need for American strength will not; there is no conceivable international scenario for the next generation that does not justify at least such a modest ongoing investment in the nation’s security. As Reagan liked to say, “Of the four wars in my lifetime, none came about because America was too strong.”
(cont)