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Shaun,
I’d take a look at that 300k number, it’s very light for what you propose. Look at force ratios of support to those out front. The helos are wearing out very fast as is the F/A-18 A-D plus lots of ground equipment.
Expanding via draft requires training, where, who does the training, etc. Lots of shortfalls in this area. Shortfalls in advanced training areas also.
You are never going to “seal” the border, reduce the flow substantially. This would have been much more effective initially but the that is history not futurity.
There are lots of problems with trying to weed out insurgents, not the least of which is we are not locals. Even bringing Persh from up North on down has limitations. Look at what is finally being allowed to happen in Anbar. Allowing the local units to work with the locals. One of the biggest problems is that every CWO-Maj. is running his small slice and doing accomplishing things in different ways (think SF writ large w/conventional units co-located). This does not translate well in hard metric numbers and thus not briefed well out of Anbar and even more mis-understood (mis-represented (deliberately or not) by the media.
I wonder why most people do not address the length of most insurgencies? The best guess in 03 from friend on Cent staffs was 8-12 years before the invasion predicated on phasing more units in and holding for a few years with more than we’ve had in at any time. Would have been cheaper in the long run . Unfortunately it would be costlier still to leave.
Just a Marine since 1980. Left end of 1999 and brought back as a regular AD Sep. 01. Overseas quite a bit and currently active duty w/some reserve units in Ft. Worth area waiting a medical retirement/disability.
S/F, FOG
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