[YTNUKLR]

stomachmonkey, Moses, sc_rufctr-

So, "to understand" is to simulate another's experience--and know the feelings and thoughts that you would have accompanying that experience?

Lazarro - I love the picture

sammy- I think you're not understanding the question (ha,ha). My question goes beyond the ontology of language to a more fundamental notion of the concept [what the hell is a "more fundamental notion of a concept"?].

How about this thought experiment: you have two people that, when given a math test, both get everything on the test correct.

Person A starts with basic assumptions (axioms), derives new theorems and then uses the theorems to get the right answers.

Person B memorizes all the formulas from a book, or memorizes proofs, then comes into the test and writes down the answers for the questions on the test.

Can you prove that one person "understands" it? They both get the same score. Person A "understands" the material better because Person A can reason through all of it from basic assumptions? Person B "understands" the material better because Person B can retain all the information necessary for success in his/her memory?

Are there degrees of understanding?

If "understanding" is on a continuum, is there a deeper level of understanding than a "fundamental concept"?

I feel like I'm at the limits of language with a question like this.

My question essentially relates to Searle's "Chinese Room" argument: if you have a person in a room who does not "understand" Chinese symbology, and rules for how to manipulate symbols in order to derive meanings in another language this person can "understand," in a way that could be interpreted by an outside observer to represent the person inside the room "understanding" Chinese, does the person inside the room understand Chinese, or not?

We can program a computer to do exactly what Person A does on a math test, given enough time and memory, and we can program a computer to do what Person B does on a math test. We can program a computer to take in one type of symbology, and according to rules, translate these sets of symbols into other sets of symbols (other languages), and we call this a translator program. Our translation programs are still not as good at language translation than native speakers are, but they are close. John Searle (and some others) would contend that the computers, no matter how they are programmed, can never "understand" math, theorems or Chinese in any real sense.

Can they?