While you are torqueing the door plug bolts you might want to swing by the wheels . Front wheel falls off preparing for takeoff ! Woops .

https://www.yahoo.com/lifestyle/wheel-falls-off-boeing-757-194444476.html

^^^ Post 118 :)

I can't say about the workers. I am biased in favor of Southerners as, in my experience, they are willing to work harder than the men who come in looking for a job in So Cal. But that's completely ancedotal.

It does appear that there is a disconnect between Spirit and Boeing and their sophisticated somewhere programs that are not really compatible with one another.

As usual, Juan Browne does (what seems to me to be) a good job explaining it.

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Boeing, not Spirit, mis-installed faulty, door plug.

https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/boeing-not-spirit-mis-installed-piece-that-blew-off-alaska-max-9-jet/

The fuselage panel that blew off an Alaska Airlines jet earlier this month was removed for repair then reinstalled improperly by Boeing mechanics on the Renton final assembly line, a person familiar with the details of the work told The Seattle Times.

If verified by the National Transportation Safety Board investigation, this would leave Boeing primarily at fault for the accident, rather than its supplier Spirit AeroSystems, which originally installed the panel into the 737 MAX 9 fuselage in Wichita, Kan.

That panel, a door plug used to seal a hole in the fuselage sometimes used to accommodate an emergency exit, blew out of Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 as it climbed out of Portland on Jan. 5. The hair-raising incident drew fresh and sharp criticism of Boeing’s quality control systems and safety culture, which has been under the microscope since two fatal 737 MAX crashes five years ago.

Last week, a different person — an anonymous whistleblower who appears to have access to Boeing’s manufacturing records of the work done assembling the specific Alaska Airlines jet that suffered the blowout — on an aviation website separately provided many additional details about how the door plug came to be removed and then mis-installed.

“The reason the door blew off is stated in black and white in Boeing’s own records,” the whistleblower wrote. “It is also very, very stupid and speaks volumes about the quality culture at certain portions of the business.”

The self-described Boeing insider said company records show four bolts that prevent the door plug from sliding up off the door frame stop pads that take the pressurization loads in flight, “were not installed when Boeing delivered the airplane.” the whistleblower stated. “Our own records reflect this.”

Having watched the Juan Browne Youtube explanation above, I wonder if the Boeing and/or Spirit work documentation systems did not differentiate adequately between:
1/ Planes fitted with the plug panel; four bolts to remove and refit with the plug panel. and
2/ Planes fitted with the emergency escape door, simply open or close, with the handle/lever.

Watch for the next NTSB, release or report for more.

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http://forums.pelicanparts.com/uploa...1706762650.jpg
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When I worked at Boeing in Charleston, they had several stand downs, where upper management talk to the workers. There was one time, where a worker walked off a raised platform, and died.

Then it was back to business as usual.

Not good.

https://www.yahoo.com/news/ex-boeing-manager-says-absolutely-162110411.html

It is always sad to see companies ruined by management short-term thinking. Seeking short term earnings at the cost of everything else. It is a good strategy for them personally if their plan is to move on before the fiddler needs to be paid.

Boeing is a particularly painful example for multiple reasons. First, because America's position in a very important worldwide industry has been a casualty. Second, because Boeing was a very proud and well-built company. Their strategy was simple: Build the finest, most reliable, most well-designed airplanes in the world with NO COMPROMISES. The rest, they figured, would follow and they were right. Also Boeing was a source of local pride. Its downfall is highly embarrassing.

Manufacturing airplanes is distinguishable from other industries in at least one important way: In many industries, the latest whiz-bang improvement or accomplishment can earn instant reputation points. In airplane manufacturing, the opposite is true. You cannot improve your reputation quickly but you can destroy it in short order. Trust takes a LONG time to rebuild, which is why we avoid betraying people. This is a betrayal, and it is doubtful Boeing will regain that trust. Ever.

Building commercial airplanes occupies its own niche in "manufacturing". "Manufacturing" is actually a misnomer, it's a very misleading way to describe how we build commercial jet aircraft. Looking at production numbers speaks to this - since 1966, so over a 58 year production life, we have built 11,660 737's of all configurations. 1,574 747's over its production life, 1,727 777's, and 1,303 767's. Ford builds that many Mustangs every week, before lunch on Mondays.

Adopting large scale, high volume systemic quality assurance models to that limited of production runs is simply futile. We have been trying to do so since at least the late 1980's without success. When we still had aeronautical and mechanical engineers in upper management positions, this was understood. Ever since they were replaced with managers from outfits like 3M, the automotive industry, etc., these newer managers with no background in aircraft construction have been convinced they can apply those methodologies. They have been proven wrong time and time again.

We had a saying while I was there that still rings true today - "every one is a prototype". Yes, every last airplane we built was, and still is, unique. This is more akin to ship building than refrigerator manufacturing. And the cost of making a mistake is oh so much higher... Ford can accept so many "escapes", and expects them, statistically. Many of their "quality control" programs are named things like "statistical process control", wherein a "bell curve" of quality is acceptable. You know you will get most parts in the center of that curve, with some parts at the right and left ends of it, but so what? You can just pull over in your Ford and call for help if you got stuck with one of those parts, and Ford can accept a certain number of customers who have negative experiences like that.

Not so with aircraft. It's significantly harder to just pull over in your 747... Every goddamned part needs to be in the center of that bell curve. There is no bell curve, really. And there is only one proven way to get that level of quality - we inspect every goddamned part. Several times, really. And guys like Gonzalez-Beltran will never understand that. They fervently believe that if the process is "under control", producing an acceptable range of variation, they no longer need to inspect every goddamned part. But they do. The old Boeing understood that.

=most understated comment on the topic of flight.

Jeff, I think you have written previously about upper management from a company Boeing took over being promoted to the top position within in an effort to improve "the bottom line ". If I remember correctly what you had related, that is the underlying problem,not only with Boeing, but with any number of companies who once were known for uncompromising quality but left quality by the wayside in the pursuit of greater profit.
I know much of this trend is driven by demands of the shareholders. It seems as if there is a parallel between companies vieing for investors' dollars and drug addicts trying to score their next hit. Sooner or later the highs are unattainable. Increasing profits in an industry which demands unrelenting precision by cutting out the inspection steps is the first step to disaster.
Profit in itself is not the problem, however the drive to risk quality in the pursuit of greater profit is a sickness.

Best
Les

This would scare me also...until someone explained it.

https://www.msn.com/en-us/travel/news/airplane-passenger-shocked-by-gaffer-tape-all-over-boeing-787-wing-what-the-hell/ar-BB1hVnyX

I guess that's OK if you make tee shirts. You make transportation that can kill, maybe the shareholder thing should be rethought. Lean on Disney to make money for you as a shareholder. They can only kill your brain.

Bingo.

In this particular case, I would almost guarantee there was no "inspector" who came behind the mechanic that had to "buy off" on his work. This was a new trend before I retired, wherein even safety of flight level components and assemblies were starting to be "self inspected" by the mechanic responsible for them. What a horrible idea with regards to something so critical. But, hey, they do it at Ford, they do it at Maytag, why can't they do it at Boeing?

Another bingo.

I was always rather proud of the fact that we "made it look easy". Boeing was that good when I started there, and through most of my career. Unfortunately, I think, we made it look so easy that the incoming non-aerospace execs actually thought it was.

Let's not forget, flying in an aluminum tube propelled by burning kerosene at 600mph way up there at 39,000 feet in -70 degrees Fahrenheit temps, all the while as comfortable (except for the seat) as we would be in our own living rooms at sea level is on the cutting edge of what humanity is capable of safely doing. It's easy to lose sight of that. Boeing has managed to do that, though.

TLDR:

Plug was fitted w/o four retainer bolts and worked itself loose after a while, popping at 16kfeet. If you zoom on one of pics, you will see a zip tie trough the holes (which might or might not be the reason why it took so long for plug to pop)

Plug was removed to do some out-of-sequence work that necessitated removal of the plug.

Due to badly managed process setup with Spirit (involving both Spirit and Boeing teams working under same roof), there was a miss in communication and documentation of the fix. FAA found no witness-marks/scuffs on the paint inside of bolt holes, indicating that there were no bolts fitted there, ever.

"Hey Bob, I thought you were to install the bolts?" "No, I thought you were??".

Alabama builds stuff for Airbus too and they are not falling from the sky. Heck, Airbus is based on different companies/countries doing their part. Key to do this is QC, documentation and inspection. Boeing dropped the ball here. If you want to outsource hi tech manufacturing, you need to have truly world-class processes/QA or it will bite you.

P.S.
I drive Alabama-build Merc...

Reminds me of the time when I was an apprentice mechanic at a major shipping company out west, working days and full school credit nights to obtain my required master mechanic degree and become journeyman.
(Looking back I'm not sure any other employee had one. Hmm. I was about the only white guy in the shop.)

I made the mistake of becoming friends with my senior journeyman who lived nearby and had a driveway to occasionally use. I helped him with some of his projects. Talked about women. Casual situation I thought. He was a Scientologist which I knew nothing about and didn't care. Said he was leaving the church. Later learned that was an 'all in' situation.

Turned out the journeyman was a complete loon. Boiling water situation. He kept increasingly wanted to 'hang out' after work and share food. Hang out with his church friends. etc I ignored the warning signs. We hung around doing nothing all day at work and had coffee with the regional manager often. He strutted around and owned that shop with the boss's blessing.

Second big mistake on my part. Went on a Tahoe ski trip where a dozen employees were supposed to have split a cabin. Cool. Meet other people. It was only him and I. Found out on the road. Skied the day but then that night he jumped all over me and wouldn't stop, which ended with him having a crying meltdown "tell me you love me". WTF? We talked. I said I didn't have hard feelings but it was a work relationship situation from now on. You do you but keep me out of it. As in: Get the f away from me dude.

Third mistake. I didn't lawyer up and file the paperwork. I didn't fight the system. People have difficult times in their lives. It would blow over. Reason would prevail eventually. I was there to learn my job and work. That was my career. But it didn't stop there. My unsupervised company assigned workload increased ten times. He would flip out in extended screaming sessions right below the boss's office open window, which was ignored. Seriously out of whack. Things like putting a washer on upside down for a mud flap ended with 15 minutes of yelling on the shop floor in front of everyone. Showing up at my apartment late at night wanting to talk. My home and car doors were often found unlocked. It was definitely a hostile work and life environment.

After months of this the boss upstairs finally talked to me. I explained the situation and was moved to another hub. Thankfully. But it was clear I was now targeted by management. On the first day the shift supervisor announced in front of the entire group "You are going to work this boy". And they did. I was running all day to the next job. Instead of a single red tag (safety issue and can't go on the road) every week or two, it was only me with two to five a day. Not including at least half a dozen green tags needing minor fixes.

This shop also didn't even stock repair manuals for the equipment.
Parts numbers for brake pods? Q or Q+ brakes? Torque specs for semi wheels?
Who needs it.

My tools disappeared. My new journeyman spent his entire day in the office drinking coffee and this apprentice did all the jobs unsupervised. Was that even legal? Some of those guys I fulled respected but it became eventually clear they had received instruction to not interact. One of the true mechs quit or retired right after my situation but maybe that was coincidence.

Strange fixes started appearing like fresh wheel oil on a PMI (preventative maintenance and inspection) when I had been previously been yelled at by my journeyman before for pulling the hub and inspecting the bearings as per the manual.

So I had to replace bearings on a double wheel dolly which connects two 28ft trailers together and get it out of the night mechanic's package car spot.
(My torque wrench went missing again.)

I asked the shift supervisor if there was a shop torque wrench to use.
"You don't have time for that".

I can only imagine what's happened to their satellite building business since they took it over from Hughes/GM.

WHY too much information.