What the Captured Documents Show

[fastpat]

Originally posted by stevepaa
Jeff,
No, it is not just a game.
I was against our decision to go to war because there was no credible evidence to start with, because I could read through the hyperbole that the admin was putting out, because I could see they were playing on our fears, because we really have no clue how to deal with middle eastern countries, because we really do not have much in common with those people beyond the need for food and shelter, because the idea of uniting Arabs is beyond a possibility, and because the idea of uniting disparate groups, and particularily warring religious groups previously held together by a strong vicious dictator is unrealistic.

All this has been tried before, nothing new here, yet the President can browbeat everyone with fear to pursue a disastrous course of action.

Well said.

[Jeff Higgins]

Originally posted by stevepaa
Jeff,
No, it is not just a game.
I was against our decision to go to war because there was no credible evidence to start with, because I could read through the hyperbole that the admin was putting out, because I could see they were playing on our fears, because we really have no clue how to deal with middle eastern countries, because we really do not have much in common with those people beyond the need for food and shelter, because the idea of uniting Arabs is beyond a possibility, and because the idea of uniting disparate groups, and particularily warring religious groups previously held together by a strong vicious dictator is unrealistic.

All this has been tried before, nothing new here, yet the President can browbeat everyone with fear to pursue a disastrous course of action.

Steve, I agree wholeheartedly except for one point. "Credible evidence". You pretty much nail everything else right on the head. We will probably forever dissagree on what constitutes that credible evidence and how much we need before we make a decision. There was intelligence that virtually the entire world agreed was valid. While we question it now, not many did then. The papers recently released support that intelligence. I am sure there is much more.

One of the things that strikes me about the "we should have known better (in light of the ensuing evidence)" crowd it that they think they have seen all of the evidence and intelligence. Or they seem upset because it was not all laid out before them, so they could analyze it and be a part of the decision making process on whether Iraq posed a threat or not. I have to believe that much of that information, as this once was, is classified for whatever reason. Maybe we will see more of it and maybe we will not.

I simply cannot believe Bush, or any President for that matter, would crank up our war machine on a personal vendetta. Or to profit his VP's former employer. Or on shakey intelligence. There is clearly far too much at stake to risk something like that poitically. That's my cynical side; I believe if nothing else a very well developed sense of political self-preservation would preclude that. In other words, I believe the decision was made on the best, most credible information available at the time. And that it was not made lightly, or with glee as some seem to believe.

As more of this kind of information trickles out (if it in fact ever does), I think it will continue to add to the case against Iraq. There will always be folks that would accept nothing less than a mushroom cloud over Jerusalem, or New York, or wherever as "credible evidence". These are the same folks that would then cry out that we should have acted sooner.

[fastpat]

Originally posted by Jeff Higgins
I simply cannot believe Bush, or any President for that matter, would crank up our war machine on a personal vendetta. Or to profit his VP's former employer. Or on shakey intelligence. There is clearly far too much at stake to risk something like that poitically. That's my cynical side; I believe if nothing else a very well developed sense of political self-preservation would preclude that. In other words, I believe the decision was made on the best, most credible information available at the time. And that it was not made lightly, or with glee as some seem to believe.

I'm curious, since it's* been done several, no make that many, times by presidents in the past, why you find it hard to believe this time?

McKinley did it, Wilson did it, Roosevelt did it, Johnson did it, Clinton did it, and Bush I did it.

*crank up our war machine on a personal vendetta. Or to profit his VP's former employer. Or on shakey intelligence.

[stevepaa]

Originally posted by Jeff Higgins
Steve, I agree wholeheartedly except for one point. "Credible evidence". You pretty much nail everything else right on the head. We will probably forever dissagree on what constitutes that credible evidence and how much we need before we make a decision. There was intelligence that virtually the entire world agreed was valid. While we question it now, not many did then. The papers recently released support that intelligence.

Not so. The supposed centrifuge tubes were not agreed to by any consensus, the yellow cake was questionable at best.

In other words, I believe the decision was made on the best, most credible information available at the time. And that it was not made lightly, or with glee as some seem to believe.

There was no preponderance of information to pursuade a reasonable person with the rightly held vison of war being a last resort. Pres Bush has the trait of making decisons for the sake of making decisons and then standing pat by them until overwhelmed. Is this case he used fear and the implied threat of being on the wrong side of the American people's safety and security to quell opposition voices.

As more of this kind of information trickles out (if it in fact ever does), I think it will continue to add to the case against Iraq. There will always be folks that would accept nothing less than a mushroom cloud over Jerusalem, or New York, or wherever as "credible evidence". These are the same folks that would then cry out that we should have acted sooner.

Not so. Send a team into Iraq to capture documents and physical evidence or bribe a scientist to defect. All things never done, because it didn't meet his limited timetable for making a decision and going for it.

[yellowline]

Originally posted by fastpat

Wilson did it, Roosevelt did it, Johnson did it*

*crank up our war machine on a personal vendetta. Or to profit his VP's former employer. Or on shakey intelligence.

Uhh, how do the Zimmerman telegram, the Lusitania sinking, Pearl Harbor, or continuing Kennedy's course of action tie into personal vendetta, profiteering, or bad intelligence?

[techweenie]

Originally posted by stevepaa
Not so. The supposed centrifuge tubes were not agreed to by any consensus, the yellow cake was questionable at best.

The 'centrifuge tubes' were not suitable for using in a centrifuge. The yellowcake letter was such an obvious fake that it wa thoroughly discredited 2-1/2 months before being referenced in the SOTU.

Lots of people may not have been paying attention in '02 and early '03 and might claim "Monday morning quarterbacking." But it was all there to see, and many people right here on Pelican and tens of thousands on hundreds of other venues tried to point out the weakness (or fiction) of the evidence.

[Rodeo]

This is all over the news today. It's extremely important not only because it lends further evidence to the supposition that WMD was a pretext, but also because it shows just how naive the admin was about the aftermath of the invasion.

This story is from the NY Times, but there are similar everywhere. It should be required reading, it's a remarkable insight:

Bush Was Set on Path to War, British Memo Says

By DON VAN NATTA Jr.

LONDON — In the weeks before the United States-led invasion of Iraq, as the United States and Britain pressed for a second United Nations resolution condemning Iraq, President Bush's public ultimatum to Saddam Hussein was blunt: Disarm or face war.

But behind closed doors, the president was certain that war was inevitable. During a private two-hour meeting in the Oval Office on Jan. 31, 2003, he made clear to Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain that he was determined to invade Iraq without the second resolution, or even if international arms inspectors failed to find unconventional weapons, said a confidential memo about the meeting written by Mr. Blair's top foreign policy adviser and reviewed by The New York Times.

"Our diplomatic strategy had to be arranged around the military planning," David Manning, Mr. Blair's chief foreign policy adviser at the time, wrote in the memo that summarized the discussion between Mr. Bush, Mr. Blair and six of their top aides.

"The start date for the military campaign was now penciled in for 10 March," Mr. Manning wrote, paraphrasing the president. "This was when the bombing would begin."

The timetable came at an important diplomatic moment. Five days after the Bush-Blair meeting, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell was scheduled to appear before the United Nations to present the American evidence that Iraq posed a threat to world security by hiding unconventional weapons.

Although the United States and Britain aggressively sought a second United Nations resolution against Iraq — which they failed to obtain — the president said repeatedly that he did not believe he needed it for an invasion.

Stamped "extremely sensitive," the five-page memorandum, which was circulated among a handful of Mr. Blair's most senior aides, had not been made public. Several highlights were first published in January in the book "Lawless World," which was written by a British lawyer and international law professor, Philippe Sands. In early February, Channel 4 in London first broadcast several excerpts from the memo.

Since then, The New York Times has reviewed the five-page memo in its entirety. While the president's sentiments about invading Iraq were known at the time, the previously unreported material offers an unfiltered view of two leaders on the brink of war, yet supremely confident.

The memo indicates the two leaders envisioned a quick victory and a transition to a new Iraqi government that would be complicated, but manageable. Mr. Bush predicted that it was "unlikely there would be internecine warfare between the different religious and ethnic groups." Mr. Blair agreed with that assessment.

The memo also shows that the president and the prime minister acknowledged that no unconventional weapons had been found inside Iraq. Faced with the possibility of not finding any before the planned invasion, Mr. Bush talked about several ways to provoke a confrontation, including a proposal to paint a United States surveillance plane in the colors of the United Nations in hopes of drawing fire, or assassinating Mr. Hussein.

Those proposals were first reported last month in the British press, but the memo does not make clear whether they reflected Mr. Bush's extemporaneous suggestions, or were elements of the government's plan.

Consistent Remarks

Two senior British officials confirmed the authenticity of the memo, but declined to talk further about it, citing Britain's Official Secrets Act, which made it illegal to divulge classified information. But one of them said, "In all of this discussion during the run-up to the Iraq war, it is obvious that viewing a snapshot at a certain point in time gives only a partial view of the decision-making process."

On Sunday, Frederick Jones, the spokesman for the National Security Council, said the president's public comments were consistent with his private remarks made to Mr. Blair. "While the use of force was a last option, we recognized that it might be necessary and were planning accordingly," Mr. Jones said.

"The public record at the time, including numerous statements by the President, makes clear that the administration was continuing to pursue a diplomatic solution into 2003," he said. "Saddam Hussein was given every opportunity to comply, but he chose continued defiance, even after being given one final opportunity to comply or face serious consequences. Our public and private comments are fully consistent."

The January 2003 memo is the latest in a series of secret memos produced by top aides to Mr. Blair that summarize private discussions between the president and the prime minister. Another group of British memos, including the so-called Downing Street memo written in July 2002, showed that some senior British officials had been concerned that the United States was determined to invade Iraq, and that the "intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy" by the Bush administration to fit its desire to go to war.

The latest memo is striking in its characterization of frank, almost casual, conversation by Mr. Bush and Mr. Blair about the most serious subjects. At one point, the leaders swapped ideas for a postwar Iraqi government. "As for the future government of Iraq, people would find it very odd if we handed it over to another dictator," the prime minister is quoted as saying.

"Bush agreed," Mr. Manning wrote. This exchange, like most of the quotations in this article, have not been previously reported.

Mr. Bush was accompanied at the meeting by Condoleezza Rice, who was then the national security adviser; Dan Fried, a senior aide to Ms. Rice; and Andrew H. Card Jr., the White House chief of staff. Along with Mr. Manning, Mr. Blair was joined by two other senior aides: Jonathan Powell, his chief of staff, and Matthew Rycroft, a foreign policy aide and the author of the Downing Street memo.

By late January 2003, United Nations inspectors had spent six weeks in Iraq hunting for weapons under the auspices of Security Council Resolution 1441, which authorized "serious consequences" if Iraq voluntarily failed to disarm. Led by Hans Blix, the inspectors had reported little cooperation from Mr. Hussein, and no success finding any unconventional weapons.

At their meeting, Mr. Bush and Mr. Blair candidly expressed their doubts that chemical, biological or nuclear weapons would be found in Iraq in the coming weeks, the memo said. The president spoke as if an invasion was unavoidable. The two leaders discussed a timetable for the war, details of the military campaign and plans for the aftermath of the war.

Discussing Provocation

Without much elaboration, the memo also says the president raised three possible ways of provoking a confrontation. Since they were first reported last month, neither the White House nor the British government has discussed them.

"The U.S. was thinking of flying U2 reconnaissance aircraft with fighter cover over Iraq, painted in U.N. colours," the memo says, attributing the idea to Mr. Bush. "If Saddam fired on them, he would be in breach."

It also described the president as saying, "The U.S. might be able to bring out a defector who could give a public presentation about Saddam's W.M.D," referring to weapons of mass destruction.

A brief clause in the memo refers to a third possibility, mentioned by Mr. Bush, a proposal to assassinate Saddam Hussein. The memo does not indicate how Mr. Blair responded to the idea.

Mr. Sands first reported the proposals in his book, although he did not use any direct quotations from the memo. He is a professor of international law at University College of London and the founding member of the Matrix law office in London, where the prime minister's wife, Cherie Blair, is a partner.
Mr. Jones, the National Security Council spokesman, declined to discuss the proposals, saying, "We are not going to get into discussing private discussions of the two leaders."

At several points during the meeting between Mr. Bush and Mr. Blair, there was palpable tension over finding a legitimate legal trigger for going to war that would be acceptable to other nations, the memo said. The prime minister was quoted as saying it was essential for both countries to lobby for a second United Nations resolution against Iraq, because it would serve as "an insurance policy against the unexpected."

The memo said Mr. Blair told Mr. Bush, "If anything went wrong with the military campaign, or if Saddam increased the stakes by burning the oil wells, killing children or fomenting internal divisions within Iraq, a second resolution would give us international cover, especially with the Arabs."

continued ...

[Rodeo]

continued ...

Running Out of Time

Mr. Bush agreed that the two countries should attempt to get a second resolution, but he added that time was running out. "The U.S. would put its full weight behind efforts to get another resolution and would twist arms and even threaten," Mr. Bush was paraphrased in the memo as saying.

The document added, "But he had to say that if we ultimately failed, military action would follow anyway."

The leaders agreed that three weeks remained to obtain a second United Nations Security Council resolution before military commanders would need to begin preparing for an invasion.

Summarizing statements by the president, the memo says: "The air campaign would probably last four days, during which some 1,500 targets would be hit. Great care would be taken to avoid hitting innocent civilians. Bush thought the impact of the air onslaught would ensure the early collapse of Saddam's regime. Given this military timetable, we needed to go for a second resolution as soon as possible. This probably meant after Blix's next report to the Security Council in mid-February."

Mr. Blair was described as responding that both countries would make clear that a second resolution amounted to "Saddam's final opportunity." The memo described Mr. Blair as saying: "We had been very patient. Now we should be saying that the crisis must be resolved in weeks, not months."


It reported: "Bush agreed. He commented that he was not itching to go to war, but we could not allow Saddam to go on playing with us. At some point, probably when we had passed the second resolutions — assuming we did — we should warn Saddam that he had a week to leave. We should notify the media too. We would then have a clear field if Saddam refused to go."

Mr. Bush devoted much of the meeting to outlining the military strategy. The president, the memo says, said the planned air campaign "would destroy Saddam's command and control quickly." It also said that he expected Iraq's army to "fold very quickly." He also is reported as telling the prime minister that the Republican Guard would be "decimated by the bombing."

Despite his optimism, Mr. Bush said he was aware that "there were uncertainties and risks," the memo says, and it goes on, "As far as destroying the oil wells were concerned, the U.S. was well equipped to repair them quickly, although this would be easier in the south of Iraq than in the north."

The two men briefly discussed plans for a post-Hussein Iraqi government. "The prime minister asked about aftermath planning," the memo says. "Condi Rice said that a great deal of work was now in hand.

Referring to the Defense Department, it said: "A planning cell in D.O.D. was looking at all aspects and would deploy to Iraq to direct operations as soon as the military action was over. Bush said that a great deal of detailed planning had been done on supplying the Iraqi people with food and medicine."

Planning for After the War
The leaders then looked beyond the war, imagining the transition from Mr. Hussein's rule to a new government. Immediately after the war, a military occupation would be put in place for an unknown period of time, the president was described as saying. He spoke of the "dilemma of managing the transition to the civil administration," the memo says.

The document concludes with Mr. Manning still holding out a last-minute hope of inspectors finding weapons in Iraq, or even Mr. Hussein voluntarily leaving Iraq. But Mr. Manning wrote that he was concerned this could not be accomplished by Mr. Bush's timeline for war.

"This makes the timing very tight," he wrote. "We therefore need to stay closely alongside Blix, do all we can to help the inspectors make a significant find, and work hard on the other members of the Security Council to accept the noncooperation case so that we can secure the minimum nine votes when we need them, probably the end of February."

At a White House news conference following the closed-door session, Mr. Bush and Mr. Blair said "the crisis" had to be resolved in a timely manner. "Saddam Hussein is not disarming," the president told reporters. "He is a danger to the world. He must disarm. And that's why I have constantly said — and the prime minister has constantly said — this issue will come to a head in a matter of weeks, not months."

Despite intense lobbying by the United States and Britain, a second United Nations resolution was not obtained. The American-led military coalition invaded Iraq on March 19, 2003, nine days after the target date set by the president on that late January day at the White House.

[fastpat]

Originally posted by yellowline
Uhh, how do the Zimmerman telegram, the Lusitania sinking, Pearl Harbor, or continuing Kennedy's course of action tie into personal vendetta, profiteering, or bad intelligence?

Profiteering should be obvious since it's occured with every war I mentioned.

Further, the questionable Zimmermann Telegram was the height of war propaganda, only a complete idiot would consider Germany's ability to give Texas to Mexico as something other than severe hyperbole. that is to say, there was no method by which that could have been accomplished.

As an aside, there was no bad intelligence that lead Bush II to invade Iraq, only fraudulent intellegence which was also the case with the Lusitania. That ship was in fact carrying war materials to Britain.

[fintstone]

I am shocked. All along liberals have claimed that Saddam had no connection with Al Qaeda...and if it were ever proved that he did...that they would fully support the war. Now we have proof that:
1. Saddam did have a relationship with Al Qaeda prior to 9/11
2. Saddam built several large training facilities to equip and train terrorists. The same type folks who attacked us on 9/11.

Now, suddenly it is about WMD alone. Funny that all the liberals can do now is come to threads regarding the Al Qaeda connection and try to change the topic to WMD...LOL

[Rodeo]

No, fint. It's neither. No WMD. No al Queda links.

Your posting there existed a Saddam/al Queda relationship carries the same credibility as your continual posting that Saddam possessed WMD.

None. No credibility at all.

Find another horse. This one is long dead.

[fastpat]

Originally posted by fintstone
I am shocked. All along liberals have claimed that Saddam had no connection with Al Qaeda...and if it were ever proved that he did...that they would fully support the war.

I haven't read that among the self described liberals on this forum, but perhaps they have at some point, that is of course, irrelevant to me.

Now we have proof that:
1. Saddam did have a relationship with Al Qaeda prior to 9/11

There's that weasel word yet again, relationship; that's strikingly similar to the words used by anti-self defense and the gun-confiscation lobby when they talk about most deaths being among acquaintances, based on FBI data that shows street gang victims and perps both know who the other is before the crime. The word is in fact meaningless with regard to Hussein governments non-involvement with Al Queda.

Let me state it for you again, maybe you missed it when I've written it in the past. The Iraqi government headed by Saddam Hussein never had an affiliation with Al Queda prior to 9/11/2001, never had a working affiliation, never encouraged, never participated with them in any way.

In fact, the Hussein government actively pursued Al Queda operatives, killing them when possible, just like they did with every other radical islamist seeking power in Iraq.

2. Saddam built several large training facilities to equip and train terrorists. The same type folks who attacked us on 9/11.

No, that's not true either, it's more Bush'ist propaganda being used in an attempt to gin up support for his collossal blunder in Iraq, and all across the mid-east.

Now, suddenly it is about WMD alone. Funny that all the liberals can do now is come to threads regarding the Al Qaeda connection and try to change the topic to WMD...LOL

Er, no, it's about a Bush'ist dream of world wide conquest on behalf of another country and for a cabal of neo-conservative mental defectives, as seen at their web site, Project for the New American Century, aka PNAC, wherein they openly discuss their plans and the need for a precipitating event such as occured on 9/11/2001.

The Iraq invasion was planned years ago, and was going to happen no matter what intelligence proved or disproved.

Frankly, your support for these monsters is appalling.

[fintstone]

Originally posted by Rodeo
No, fint. It's neither. No WMD. No al Queda links.

Your posting there existed a Saddam/al Queda relationship carries the same credibility as your continual posting that Saddam possessed WMD.

None. No credibility at all.

Find another horse. This one is long dead.

Amazing!

[fintstone]

Originally posted by fastpat
I haven't read that among the self described liberals on this .....

Really amazing!

[rcecale]

Originally posted by fastpat
Let me state it for you again, maybe you missed it when I've written it in the past. The Iraqi government headed by Saddam Hussein never had an affiliation with Al Queda prior to 9/11/2001, never had a working affiliation, never encouraged, never participated with them in any way.

Yep, just keep repeating it Pat, old boy. That's sure to make it come true. I mean, it worked for Dorothy, didn't it? Although, let me advise you, you'd look awfully silly with those ruby shoes on your feet...IMHO



Randy

[techweenie]

This is as close as it ever got.

[fintstone]

So weenie, how do you explain away the recently released documents? Forgery? Bad translation? Liberals can't read? It puts the President in a much better light...so it can't be right? Please explain.

[Tobra]

After reading through this entire mess, I can say one thing with certainty. None of the anti-administration folks gleaned anything from the proffered article. This stuff implies there was a Somalia-Saddam link(Remember Black Hawk Down, the movie?), as well as a link between OBL and Iraq

I can only guess that if there were video of Saddam handing a vial of stuff labeled "Anthrax-Peligro" to OBL they would say no, it was an empty vial. Y'all are astounding.

[fastpat]

Originally posted by Tobra
After reading through this entire mess, I can say one thing with certainty.

There is a certainty here, all right.

None of the anti-administration folks gleaned anything from the proffered article.

Because it's propaganda.

This stuff implies there was a Somalia-Saddam link(Remember Black Hawk Down, the movie?), as well as a link between OBL and Iraq

No, there's no link there either.

I can only guess that if there were video of Saddam handing a vial of stuff labeled "Anthrax-Peligro" to OBL they would say no, it was an empty vial. Y'all are astounding.

Wrong. This junta currently in the White House will do anything, say anything, or create anything to make this running tragedy appear to have been correct three years ago.

It was known to be wrong then, it's wrong today, and will be wrong tomorrow. It won't matter what new evidence this administration gins up, nothing will save them from collapse and disgrace; nor will it save those that support the mass murdering SOB from the same fate.

[Jeff Higgins]

It's very predictable, the difference in credibility assigned by our liberal friends concerning the recently released documents referenced in the start of this thread and stuff like Rodeo jut posted.

While I will not dispute Mr. Manning's account of the private meeting between Blair and Bush, it remains the assertion of one man that these things were said. A man that very clearly has no reservations about making public things that were said in confidence, behind closed doors. It appears Rodeo has no trouble at all accepting this man's word as the truth; a man that has violated the trust of those who placed their trust in him. Of course the liberal press is more than willing to run with this, with no further corraboration required. They like it because it fits their agenda. They learned nothing from Rather.

On the other hand, we have recently de-classified information collected by our intelligence folks. Much of it collected pre-Dubya, in fact. What this intelligence reveals is questioned immediately by the left. They will not buy it until they see some kind of corraboration. It does, after all, fly in the face of their most dearly held beliefs. So they ignore it, hoping it will go away. They sure get all giddy at any "news" that indicates Bush is bad, rushing eagerly to report any and all of it. Their capacity to ignore any news that indicates Bush might have gotten something right is limitless. It's gotten just too darn predictable to even be fun anymore.