Your new fighter...F-35

[Rick Lee]

I saw a JSF at a recent airshow. May have a photo of it somewhere. Very impressive.

[fastpat]

Originally posted by mikester
Dad an I were in a conversation a few months about about the differences between American fighters and Russian fighters. The russians have almost always developed theirs with the turn and burn mentality where as we have always had the "better" idea of shooting them down before we are even detected. While I do hold that as an ideal situation I wondered to him (retired airforce air crew) how an F22 or an F35 would stack up turning and burning against one of the newer russian made aircraft or even against an american made F-14/15/16 which we have sold to many folks around the world.

He was quite certain that it would never matter and that just reminded me of how Air Force folks thought in Vietnam.

It's how you use the wand, not how big it is.

[MFAFF]

Whipped...

The F-16s sold overseas are not dumbed down....in fact the latest Middle East versions are more capable than the USAF ones.. becuase the USAF uses F-15Es rather than 16s in the equivalent roles..

When GD proposed a dumbed down, the F16/79 version as a cheap and cheerful option it achieved a total sales of 0...nobody wanted it...

The F-35 is an incredible pice of design and engineering, however it has succumbed to the now traditional 'gold plated' mentality that affects both the US and European procurement. So we get a limited number of very expenisve, yet highly capable airframes, whose ability to deal with current threats is debatable if not predictable....

These are great planes, like the F-22, a source of real pride to all those involved in their creation.

The F-14s exported to Iran remain the only airworthy 14s, albeit limited in comparison to more modern fighters. As a result the now retired USN 14s are being demil'ed far more extensively to prevent the Iranians getting thier hands on parts.....

The F-15s that have been exported, especially the S and K versions are directly comparable to the latest USAF E versions...but fighting Korea or Singapore is not likely...

The F-22, being a generation later, is more than able to turn and burn with the Flankers et al....as well as having a very long reach and very reduced RCS...But they are likely to need that ability as they are likely to meet much larger numbers, especially as the Chinese ramp up local production.

Fast...

The wand only works if you teach the guys how to use it.. as task the USAF and the USN singularly failed to do until the 1970s, when had the dedicated ACM 'crash' programmes not been instigated, the kill ratio would have remained at parity or best around 2:1. But considering the number of 2 seater loses and the value of those a/c a net loss in man power and $ to the US. Thankfully the programme delivered and delivered quickly to enable the US to bring the ratio back to the 6:1 or so overall and in the later stages, taken in isolation, more like 10:1.. a perfectly respectable score.

Remember this is all done with 'one arm tied behind your back' as the ROE dictated visual ID of target before weapons release, negating the BVR advantage of the Sparrow, even with its lowly PK...mind you the ROE in Gulf War 1 were similarly strict in order to prevent blue on blue. I would imagine the same is true to this day and short of a revolution in IFF technolgy it will remain so even with the F-22.....

Still ,it all wonderful stuff for aviation buffs....

[BRPORSCHE]

Originally posted by fastpat
The F-35 is only slightly larger than the F-16.

That's the two-seat F-16B in the photo.

mmm the F-16 is really starting to grow on me. I have always been an naval man thru and thru, but ever since moving to Houston there is an AFB about 5 miles north of here with an active F-16 wing.

[fastpat]

Yes, as I've said, military hardware in neat fun; and largely a complete waste of money and ultimately, human beings.

F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Lightning II Program

F-35/JSF production totals are more likely to be in the 2,000-3,000 aircraft range than the 4,000-5,000 or 6,000 sometimes cited. Foreign partners have expressed intent to buy about 700 aircraft between 2012 and 2015, but no formal agreements have been signed as of early 2005.

In 1996 the program included 2,978 aircraft for the US: 2,036 for the Air Force, 642 for the Marines, 300 for the US Navy, as well as another 60 for the Royal Navy. The May 1997 QDR reduced procurement for the US to 2,852: 1,763 for the Air Force, 609 for the Marines, and up to 480 for the Navy. The 1997 QDR noted that up to 230 of the Navy's 480 JSFs could be replaced by F/A-18E/Fs, depending on the progress of the JSF program and the price of its Navy variant compared to the F/A-18E/F.

As of 2001 the first operational Joint Strike Fighter, re-designated as the F-35, was scheduled for delivery in fiscal 2008. A total of 2,852 planes were scheduled for delivery starting in 2008 for the US Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and a small number to the British Royal Navy. Other nations interested in participating in the program include the Netherlands, Belgium and Norway. The requirements of 1,763 strike fighters for the Air Force, 609 for the Marine Corps and 480 for the Navy had held steady since the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review.

As of 2001 program estimates peg the recurring JSF unit flyaway costs at $37 million for the Air Force conventional takeoff and landing variant, $46 million for the Marine Corps short takeoff vertical landing variant and $48 million for the Navy carrier version, in 2002 dollars.

As of late March 2002 the Pentagon was reviewing a proposal to cut JSF production by 400 aircraft and limit the Navy's F/A-18E/F acquisition to 460 aircraft versus 548. The JSF reductions, which could be split about equally between the Marine Corps STOVL and the Navy's carrier versions, would reduce the total buy to about 2,600.

In April 2002 the Navy - concerned that it could not afford the number of tactical aircraft it planned to purchase - reduced the number of JSF aircraft for joint Navy and Marine Corps operations from 1,089 to 680 by reducing the number of backup aircraft needed. News reports in 2002 indicated that the proposed reduction would cut 259 jets from the Marine Corps buy, and 50 from the Navy purchase, resulting in a total F-35B buy of 350.

JSF Program 2003 Developements

The Pentagon requested $3.4 billion for JSF development in fiscal year 2003, up from $1.5 billion in FY2002. At that time the planned budget was $3.8 billion in fiscal 2004, $5.7 billion in 2005 and $5.7 billion in 2006.

As of early 2003 the Air Force was tentatively scheduled to receive its first F-35 in 2008, but initial operational capability (IOC) for the service was set for 2011. The US Navy, along with the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force, was scheduled for a 2012 IOC. The Marine Corps, with an IOC planned for 2010, would be the first of the military services to operate a fleet of F-35s.

By the end of 2003 it appeared that the cost of developing the Joint Strike Fighte could increase by as much as $5 billion, to $38 billion, and the project could fall more than a year behind schedule. The increase would be mostly because of the higher-than-expected cost of developing parts of the technology and the addition of new capabilities for the fighter jet. Part of the additional cost would be to add anti-tampering technology to the plane, which would prevent foreign buyers from replicating sensitive systems. That could add $1 billion to $2 billion to the program's budget. The proposed increase would also put aside more money for unforeseen changes in design requested by the military or for development problems. The Joint Strike Fighter was expected to be the largest weapons program in Pentagon history, ultimately costing nearly $200 billion. The first fighter was expected to enter service in 2008.

JSF Program 2004 Developements

According to the DOT&E, weight growth was a significant risk for all three variants of the F-35 JSF. Aircraft weight is not a key performance parameter, but weight does impact the aircraft's ability to satisfy key performance requirements. No variant of the F- 35 JSF design exceeds the weight at which key performance parameters predictions are breached; however, the STOVL design remained consistently above target weight projections. The JPO was aggressively pursuing weight reduction initiatives. Additional aircraft weight reductions were required, particularly in the case of the STOVL variant, to satisfy all key performance parameters and preserve sufficient weight reserve for post SDD block upgrades.

Weight issues and signifi cant fundamental configuration changes forced the conclusion that the air vehicle design was insuffi ciently mature to satisfy all criteria for an upcoming Air System Critical Design Review. Thus, a new culture emerged that involved establishment of new indicators of progress, directed by clearly identified goals for the 2004-2005 time frame. Expect the Exceptional became much more than a Guiding Principle - it was a daily operating principle.

The F-35 JSF Program SDD schedule is aggressive and aircraft weight reduction efforts have eroded a significant portion of available development time. The first flight of the US Air Force conventional takeoff and landing variant was scheduled for 2005, followed by the STOVL variant. This schedule is very challenging. The F-35 JSF Program should remain event driven with continued weight reduction efforts and design optimization before producing SDD test aircraft. The decisions the JPO face at this point in the program are significant drivers to cost and performance limitations through the life cycle of an aircraft.

In 2004, DOD extended the JSF program schedule to address problems discovered during systems integration and the preliminary design review. Design efforts revealed significant airframe weight problems that affected the aircraft's ability to meet key performance requirements. Software development and integration also posed a significant development challenge. Program officials delayed the critical design reviews, first flights of development aircraft, and the low-rate initial production decision to allow more time to mitigate design risk and gather more knowledge before continuing to make major investments. As a result, the initial operational capability date was delayed.

As of late 2004 there was uncertainty about the number and mix of variants the services plan to purchase will also affect JSF's acquisition plans. While the Air Force had announced its intention to acquire the short takeoff and vertical landing variant, it had yet to announce when or how many it expects to buy or how this purchase will affect the quantity of the conventional takeoff and landing variant it plans to buy. In December 2004, Air Combat Command officials indicated that the Air Force was considering buying about 250 short takeoff and landing JSFs and about 1,300 conventional takeoff and landing JSFs. However, these numbers were not official.

The number and mix of JSF variants that the Navy and Marine Corps intend to purchase - and their related procurement costs - remain undetermined. However, as of late 2004 the Navy had not indicated to the developer the exact mix of the carrier and short takeoff and vertical landing variants it intended to purchase.

The cost estimate to fully develop the JSF had increased by over 80 percent from 1996 to 2004. DOD expected that by using a joint development program for the three variants instead of three separate programs, JSF development costs could be cut by about 40 percent. However, cost increases have nearly eroded all of the estimated savings. Development costs were originally estimated at $24.8 billion. By the 2001 system development decision, these costs had increased by $9.6 billion largely because of a 36-month schedule extension to allow more time to mature the mission systems and a more mature cost estimate.

The program successfully completed a DAB review on June 17, 2004. However, there continue to be some concerns with Congressional funding, as represented by the House Armed Services Committee decision to reduce funding to the program pending the IRT report and the JSF program office response.

In November 2004 Defense Department's Acting Undersecretary for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Michael Wynne approved program changes to fix a weight problem plaguing one version of the plane. He also authorized a transition production contract for the F136 engine, made by General Electric and Rolls-Royce Group. This review focused on the cost and schedule implications of the re-baseline effort, contractor performance to date on STOVL weight reduction, and the program's response to the IRT report on the program.

By 2004, costs increased an additional $10.4 billion to $44.8 billion. The program office cited several reasons, including efforts to achieve greater international commonality, optimize engine interchangeability, refine the estimating methodology, and extend the schedule for unexpected design work. Almost half of this increase, $4.9 billion, was a result of an approximately 18-month delay for unexpected design work caused by increased aircraft weight that degraded the aircraft's key performance capabilities.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military//systems/aircraft/f-35-program.htm

[onewhippedpuppy]

Pat, I'm still waiting for you to prove that we're selling F22s to our enemies. Both of your cut-and-paste jobs regarded the PROPOSAL to sell F22s to JAPAN. In both articles there was the suggestion that the aircraft would have to be watered down in order for the sale to be approved by the Pentagon. Thanks for at least using reputable sources though.

MFAFF, I stand corrected, it's probable that this was an outdated notion from when these aircraft were state of the art. Funny that you bring up the Iranian F14s, because I watched the F14 show last night. What do you think the odds are of those aircraft making it back into the air, even if they were able to obtain the necessary parts? Further, I wonder if they even have pilots and maintenance crews with the ability to maintain them? 25 years later, I really doubt it.

[onewhippedpuppy]

Also, did anyone else notice the fact that the Japanese air force is still using F4s?

[fastpat]

Originally posted by onewhippedpuppy
Pat, I'm still waiting for you to prove that we're selling F22s to our enemies.

Since I never implied or stated that, you're likely to wait a long time, but don't let that stop you. What has happened, as the initial article stated, is that aircraft have been sold to countries that later, usually for failure to genuflect properly to one US president or another, are declared to be enemies. Got to have enemies with good equipment, how else are the M/IC going to con the booboise into buying these expensive militoys, eh?

Both of your cut-and-paste jobs regarded the PROPOSAL to sell F22s to JAPAN.

Hyperlinks aren't "cut and pastes", please learn the difference.

In both articles there was the suggestion that the aircraft would have to be watered down in order for the sale to be approved by the Pentagon. Thanks for at least using reputable sources though.

In actual fact, USG aircraft sold to foreign sources are seldom "watered down", and since are frequently from later blocks of aircraft, are better than the USG versions.

MFAFF, I stand corrected, it's probable that this was an outdated notion from when these aircraft were state of the art. Funny that you bring up the Iranian F14s, because I watched the F14 show last night. What do you think the odds are of those aircraft making it back into the air, even if they were able to obtain the necessary parts? Further, I wonder if they even have pilots and maintenance crews with the ability to maintain them? 25 years later, I really doubt it.

[Joeaksa]

Originally posted by Moneyguy1
They are all beginning to look alike. I am sure the differences are incremental and subtle.

Ahhhh..What do I know? All REAL aircraft have propellors!!!

Props are for boats...

[m21sniper]

One of the lads at my board works for Lockmart in the F-35 program. Worked the F-22 before that. He loves the F-22, raves about it, but is suspiciously lax in his praise about the F-35(though he never outright says anything bad about it).

The F-35B especially strikes me as 'optimistic'.

[m21sniper]

Originally posted by Moneyguy1
They are all beginning to look alike. I am sure the differences are incremental and subtle.

Ahhhh..What do I know? All REAL aircraft have propellors!!!

|

Actually because of systems integration and processing power the F-22 and F-35 are both supposed to be quantum leaps in auctual 'lethality'. They both have a new kind of radar called AESA/LPI (Low Probability of intercept) too. Their all internal weapons carriage should also really reduce drag too. And of course they're both "Stealth."

I have no idea if it's all true or not, but it sure sounds good.

At any rate the F-35 is seemingly very ill suited for one of it's primary intended roles(CAS). This is what a CAS plane looks like:


"Ugly, but well hung."

[onewhippedpuppy]

Ah yes, the A-10. The ultimate example of function over form. Ugly beautiful.

Pat, I could retort to you totally disregarding my statements, but what's the point? The sky is yellow and the sun is blue in your world anyway.

[rick-l]

Selling a few F-22s to Japan would sure improve our trade balance. Probably not going to happen.

The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter was from the new world peace era. It is for all the services (Army Navy Air Force Marines) and none of them really want it (Maybe the Marines a little). One plane for all the services to save cost. Jack of all trades master of none.

These are my personal opinions.

[mikester]

I don't know where you guys get off saying an A-10 is in any way shape or form ugly.

It's a beautiful example of a purpose built gun. It has but three purposes as I see it; Fly, Kill the enemy and protect the pilot. I will reiterate what I have already said. It is a beautiful example of what an aircraft can be.

[legion]

I love the A10.

I was watching a show on it the other day. The barrels on the gun are 21' (feet) long!

[fastpat]

I like the A-10 as well, unfortunately it's proven all too vulnerable in a high threat environment, so it's being withdrawn from most combat roles and will eventually be scrapped.

Besides, when you keep updating older designs, you never get to make a huge killing in the weapons business.

And, whippedpuppy, your "questions, such as they were, were answered in toto". If you didn't see the answer you were looking for, assume it wasn't available, or ask again. Your choice.

[mikester]

I find it hard to believe this f-35 fighter will be able to operate in theater the way that the A-10 does. The A-10 is quite manuverable in the low and slow environment - how will the F-35 do that? They aren't expecting that the VTOL model will actually replace the A-10.

[fastpat]

Originally posted by mikester
I find it hard to believe this f-35 fighter will be able to operate in theater the way that the A-10 does. The A-10 is quite manuverable in the low and slow environment - how will the F-35 do that? They aren't expecting that the VTOL model will actually replace the A-10.

Apparently so, but the Air Force has wanted to abandon the CAS roll for years. In fact, during the mid-80's they were going to ditch the aircraft, and abandon the CAS mission to the helicopter. The Army stood up and said, we'll take them and modify the "no combat fixed-wing" rule that the Army has lived under since the early '60's. The Air Force changed their minds and kept it on.

[Super_Dave_D]

Its interesting to know that the F14 was only sold to one foreign country, Iran. They we identical to the US version minus classified avionics.

[fastpat]

Even more interesting is that those not damaged in combat or in accidents are mostly flyable, their avionics have been substantially improved (and lightened), and are still flying today.