Another brand new 737 Max crashes

[kach22i]

Originally Posted by javadog

I have a feeling that inadequate training is going to be factor in this accident. It looks pretty certain that MCAS was involved and I’d wager that the pilots did not deal with it correctly. The root cause is still far from known but what has been published of the flight data so far shows some really odd values for the airspeed.

The extra training and MCAS would not be nessary if this plane didn't have a design flaw, or should I say shortcoming.

I know this sounds like blaming the design of the 911 and not the driver when in a turn the driver slams on the brakes or stomps on the gas and spins off the road tail first.

When you have a machine that is different the operator should be well aware of it's limitations.

Punch the gas too much on a 737 Max, nose goes up, MCAS puts you into a nose dive to avoid stall and the pilot is no longer in control of the aircraft - NOT GOOD.

Automation should be an aid to make the craft fly better and easier to control, and not a band-aid to fix a major design flaw - in my opinion.

Pilots complained about autopilot issues with Boeing jets involved in two deadly crashes
https://www.theverge.com/2019/3/13/18263751/boeing-737-max-8-pilot-complaint-autopilot-mcas

The airplane’s nose can tilt down suddenly during takeoff, pilots aren’t being adequately trained on the autopilot system, and the operations manual is “criminally insufficient.” These are the complaints of US pilots in incident reports involving Boeing’s 737 Max 8 jetliner, the same model that was involved in two deadly crashes in recent months.

The reports, which were reported by multiple news outlets this week, cast a harsh light on the Max 8 jet that have been at the center of a global ban. More than 40 countries have grounded the airplane following two deadly crashes, one in Indonesia and the more recent one in Ethiopia. But the US Federal Aviation Administration continues to allow the plane to fly, and the Trump administration is being criticized for putting Boeing’s well-being over the safety of American passengers.

Part of the planned update includes improving the Max 8’s “Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System,” Boeing said. According to The Air Current, the system was put in place to account for “some unique aircraft handling characteristics.”

.....................some unique aircraft handling characteristics................like flying into the ground on it's own?

[javadog]

I don't think you understand the MCAS system. There's a lot of info out there, some of it accurate, some of it not (like what you posted above.)

[Jeff Higgins]

Originally Posted by madcorgi

I have a gadget that looks like a push-broom with wheels that has a strong magnet in it. I use it frequently when I drop fasteners in my shop--picks up anything ferrous. Sounds like you guys could have used one. Unless the nut was titanium or something.

Spent a couple years prowling the factory floor during the 777 AP #1 era. Our factories were pretty damn clean, but the Heavies' even were cleaner. I visited them all as one of Mulally's entourage in 93 or 94.

The Dreamliner fiasco was a disaster that simply would not have happened under the "old guard" whose tender ministrations gently guided me for two years with exhortations of "I'm gonna put my foot up your ass sideways!" Missing an on-dock date by even a day was unimaginable, much less a couple of years!

It was the most inefficient, wasteful management system I ever saw, but we made our on-dock dates. Proving the time-honored rule that companies that can afford wasteful inefficiency tend to indulge in it. I had twice as many on my staff as I needed, all lifers way older than me, with too little meaningful work to keep them all busy, yet my bosses wanted to continue to grow their fiefdoms. I had two senior managers between me and my director.Morale was ****, and we lost every decent person we had. My Boeing on-site manager in Gifu was an idiot, went completely native, and could not get anything done. That guy could not have pulled a greasy string out of a sick cat's ass. He became an enemy, bombing us every night with faxes. After rollout, I got bored and left for my next Boeing gig before the layoffs and buyouts started. Everyone I knew either retired or bailed.

Gorgeous airplane, though. And all the parts made it on dock on schedule.

My experiences exactly. In the manufacturing side of the house, anyway. I'm afraid, or strongly suspect anyway, that every large manufacturer is like that, at least to a degree.

AOG was a haven from that. We had the luxury of the ability to quite thoroughly screen anyone and everyone who aspired to join our team. And yes, quite credible threats of "my foot up your ass" occurred on a daily basis. Failure, or even any measure of underperformance, was simply not an option.

Probably 3/4 of the guys who tried to get on the team washed out. We all had to travel on at least a couple, maybe three "tryout" trips, whereupon every member of the team on that trip got to vote on the new guy. Managers, engineers, QA personal - everyone voted. There was no hiding, no just "getting along" - you rocked your job or you went back to manufacturing.

Those of us who made the cut were in aerospace heaven - surrounded by the best of the best. Everyone worked their asses off. Everyone went that "extra mile" - or ten. We knew we could count on each other to do that. Everyone knew their stuff inside out, upside down, backwards and forwards. Fakes and morons were outed before their first trip was over. No "google educated experts" putting shopping cart wheels under their cars need apply.

[kach22i]

Originally Posted by javadog

I don't think you understand the MCAS system. There's a lot of info out there, some of it accurate, some of it not (like what you posted above.)

The last link wasn't exclusively about the Ethiopia incident, sorry about any confusion that may have caused you.

Ethiopian Airlines says analysis of flight recorders begins
https://www.apnews.com/e3feece30da04f8c801e63d45b9cdb87

HEJERE, Ethiopia (AP) — Analysis of the flight recorders of the crashed Ethiopian Airlines plane has begun, the airline said Friday, and The New York Times reported that the pilot requested permission “in a panicky voice” to return to the airport shortly after takeoff as the plane dipped up and down sharply and appeared to gain startling speed.

The report cited “a person who reviewed air traffic communications” from Sunday’s flight saying controllers noticed the plane was moving up and down by hundreds of feet.

Doing a Google search with the terms "titan-server.arc.nasa.gov" I found this.

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=19373707

1. There have been 865 737 related ASRS reports since 1/1/2018

I never knew pilots had to write so many reports, some of these are almost novels based on detail and length.

Some scary stuff, like flight recorders not even installed.

[David]

A question to pilots: how many planes nose up when you throttle up?

[Fly Mach .86]

Originally Posted by David

A question to pilots: how many planes nose up when you throttle up?

They almost ALL nose up but it's a question of degree. Under wing mounted engines will nose up to some degree when power is increased. An increase in speed will also necessitate a down movement with the trim wheel because of a nose up tendency. This should be easily controlled and is not a violent change in pitch attitude. (At least it shouldn't be).

[gordner]

The 200 hour FO was most likely the pilot-not-flying, if the high time captain had been PNF the MCAS system would likely have been inhibited right away, turned off and breakers pulled.
Both PNF and PF have duties that can be critical depending on the flight phase. A 200 hour guy in the right seat is honestly absolutely a disaster waiting to happen.

[flipper35]

Originally Posted by kach22i

Wow, this is the most informative big picture presentation of the 737 Max system/situation I've seen to date.

Thank you for posting it.

It kind of smacks me in the head with a big "duh" moment.

A comment from the link above.



EDIT-1:

A link from Dan's link.

737 MAX - MCAS
737 MAX - MCAS


Band-aids don't fix everything, I learned that as a kid.

EDIT-2:

Based on a reader's comment in Dan's link I looked up an earlier 737 problem.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_737_rudder_issues

Mac McClellan has a good article on it. The one above isn't as concise as it should be and misses a couple points. One thing odd is the transponder on the Ethiopian flight cuts off while still at altitude which may corroborate some witnesses mentioning fire on board.

https://airfactsjournal.com/2019/03/can-boeing-trust-pilots/

"This concept of adding artificial feel using the pitch trim has been around for years. It has been used to add stick force at high speed cruise where Mach effects can alter stick force as well as at higher AOA where stall margins must be maintained.

What’s critical to the current, mostly uninformed discussion is that the 737 MAX system is not triply redundant. In other words, it can be expected to fail more frequently than one in a billion flights, which is the certification standard for flight critical systems and structures."

"Though the pitch system in the MAX is somewhat new, the pilot actions after a failure are exactly the same as would be for a runaway trim in any 737 built since the 1960s. As pilots we really don’t need to know why the trim is running away, but we must know, and practice, how to disable it."

[Seahawk]

Originally Posted by gordner

The 200 hour FO was most likely the pilot-not-flying, if the high time captain had been PNF the MCAS system would likely have been inhibited right away, turned off and breakers pulled.
Both PNF and PF have duties that can be critical depending on the flight phase. A 200 hour guy in the right seat is honestly absolutely a disaster waiting to happen.

Not necessarily true...I have flown with some low time in model folks that had it wrapped.

The issue to me is needing to pull a circuit breaker...that is completely unsat...and would be the reason I would have grounded the aircraft.

A pilot needs an on/off switch, a method of overriding all "aids" to flight that is in scan and reach immediately; day and night, visual and instrument scan.

The start of a flight and the terminal phase of a flight are when the aircrew is most diligent...that is when the majority of aircraft accidents happen.

[flipper35]

Originally Posted by Fly Mach .86

They almost ALL nose up but it's a question of degree. Under wing mounted engines will nose up to some degree when power is increased. An increase in speed will also necessitate a down movement with the trim wheel because of a nose up tendency. This should be easily controlled and is not a violent change in pitch attitude. (At least it shouldn't be).

In this case the engines are further forward, larger and more powerful moving the thrust line further from the center of gravity which exacerbates the issue. The MCAS was designed, in part, to make the MAX feel the same as an older airframe like the NG. Making it fly like the older airframe means there does not have to be significant training involved to fly the new airframe saving airlines money.

[Neilk]

So apparently Boeing is going to roll out a software fix in 10 days.

I am curious how are airplanes updated, I imagine it is more than a USB drive?

[flipper35]

Same way Tesla does it!

[javadog]

Originally Posted by Seahawk

Not necessarily true...I have flown with some low time in model folks that had it wrapped.

The issue to me is needing to pull a circuit breaker...that is completely unsat...and would be the reason I would have grounded the aircraft.

A pilot needs an on/off switch, a method of overriding all "aids" to flight that is in scan and reach immediately; day and night, visual and instrument scan.

The start of a flight and the terminal phase of a flight are when the aircrew is most diligent...that is when the majority of aircraft accidents happen.

The MCAS system is disabled temporarily by a trim switch input by either pilot. That would buy enough time to flip the circuit breaker’s. I think the difficulty lies in the pilots recognizing what’s going on. There of been incidents in the US where the pilots had to intervene and they had no difficulty.

I think there is a difference in how the AOA information is fed into the computer, on the left and right sides of the cockpit. I don’t recall the details, but I think there was something different on the right side, which made me wonder at the time why they did it.

I really wonder how much of the problem lies with the complexity of the training and of the manuals and the fact that for many of these pilots English is not their first language.

[Eric Coffey]

Originally Posted by flipper35

https://airfactsjournal.com/2019/03/can-boeing-trust-pilots/

"Though the pitch system in the MAX is somewhat new, the pilot actions after a failure are exactly the same as would be for a runaway trim in any 737 built since the 1960s."

That isn't entirely true.


From post #44:

Originally Posted by Eric Coffey

...there is another aspect of the MCAS system that I can see compounding the problem, especially under stress. That is the yoke break-away. Typically, one could simply apply enough force on the yoke in the opposite direction to disengage the AP/electric trim commands. On the MCAS-equipped Max, pulling back on the control column will not disengage stab. trim if the problem was caused by faulty AOA sensor. Yikes...

From post #87:

Originally Posted by Eric Coffey

That said, I still think the big problem is the lack of training/awareness of the new system, and the differences in the initial runaway trim procedure.
As I mentioned previously, one could halt runaway trim on the "old" 737 by simply pulling back on the column (break-away). That won't work on an MCAS equipped A/C. You have to disable the trim altogether (cut-out).
While that was always the final step in the "old" 737 runaway trim procedure, the initial step of pulling back on the yoke no longer works with a faulty MCAS system. Sort of counter-intuitive, IMO.

[Eric Coffey]

Originally Posted by gordner

A 200 hour guy in the right seat is honestly absolutely a disaster waiting to happen.

Agree.

From post #116:

Originally Posted by Eric Coffey

The FO on that A/C is reported to have +/- 200 hours TOTAL. If that's true, it is rather scary.
You would not be allowed to fly right seat (SIC/FO) of any commercial airline in the US with only 200 hrs. That is WAY below even the lowest "restricted" ATP requirements.

[flipper35]

Originally Posted by Eric Coffey

That isn't entirely true.


From post #44:


From post #87:

To disengage, you are correct, but to disable it is to pull the breakers. Using the trim buttons will disengage it temporarily as well. In any case, they should all know that pulling the breakers will disable the electric trim.

[Eric Coffey]

Originally Posted by Seahawk

The issue to me is needing to pull a circuit breaker...that is completely unsat...and would be the reason I would have grounded the aircraft.

A pilot needs an on/off switch, a method of overriding all "aids" to flight that is in scan and reach immediately; day and night, visual and instrument scan.

Originally Posted by flipper35

To disengage, you are correct, but to disable it is to pull the breakers. Using the trim buttons will disengage it temporarily as well.

Just to clarify, there is no "pulling a breaker" here. This isn't a 707, lol.

As mentioned previously, there are 2 stab. trim switches on the center pedestal. Flipping those down to "cut-out" completely disables all auto trim. Been that way (and in that location) for several generations now.

Visual aid:

[Seahawk]

Originally Posted by Eric Coffey

Just to clarify, there is no "pulling a breaker" here. This isn't a 707, lol.

As mentioned previously, there are 2 stab. trim switches on the center pedestal. Flipping those down to "cut-out" completely disables all auto trim. Been that way (and in that location) for several generations now.

I violated my own rule of accident investigations!

Thanks for the visual.

[flipper35]

Originally Posted by Eric Coffey

Just to clarify, there is no "pulling a breaker" here. This isn't a 707, lol.

As mentioned previously, there are 2 stab. trim switches on the center pedestal. Flipping those down to "cut-out" completely disables all auto trim. Been that way (and in that location) for several generations now.

Visual aid:

Sorry, my bad on that.

[jyl]

I read that radar data showed the plane accelerating to very unusual speed during the flight. What's that about?